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Abstract 
My focus is on assessment criteria of language proficiency in community college 
education. To demand clear writing is an application of scientism; it seeks to keep 
separate the fact/value distinction of positivism. This dangerously undermines the 
democratizing possibilities of education, since clear writing, taken to its extreme, is 
ultimately anonymous and dehumanizing. The active student-as-citizen is, therefore, 
subsumed under the neoliberal dictate of the passive student-as-consumer. The process of 
language acquisition is reduced to a fictitious act of knowledge transmission and 
regurgitation, and, therefore, those subversive aspects of language learning, such as 
creativity and critical inquiry, are undermined. An initial overview of the tenets of 
modernity will provide a conceptual framework for this examination. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE TYRANNY OF PROGRESS  
"Progress and Doom are two sides of the same medal . . . both are articles of superstition, 
not of faith" (Hannah Arendt, 1973, p. vii). 
“In every new venture, there must be a vision of the future, a vision which enables the 
pioneer to project his thoughts and ideals beyond the arduous first steps. Where goals are 
clear and high, progress is sure and sound” (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, p. 
32). 
The Tenets of Modernity 
 On a bright cold morning in December 1962, a little over 4 weeks after John F. 
Kennedy proved victorious in the Cuban Missile Crisis and less than 3 years before 
Ontario's first community college opened its doors, comrades of the Soviet Republic 
woke to read in Krasnaya Zvezda, the official newspaper of the Ministry of Defense, a 
headline that spoke of a glorious testament to progress. For the first time in the history of 
mankind, an interstellar transmission was sent from the Evpatoria Observatory in Crimea 
towards the planet Venus. In Morse code, the goddess of love, sex, and fertility received 
the words MIR LENIN SSSR: WORLD LENIN USSR (Kotenikov Institute of Radio 
Engineering and Electronics of the Russian Astronomical Society, 2014). Perhaps after 
the failure of the recent launch of Venera 2, a space probe that exploded before sending 
any data, scientists hoped to make contact with any sentient beings living under the 
clouds of sulfuric acid. But it made no matter. The feat was a test of the observatory's 
capabilities to find the astronomical unit, the distance from the Earth to the Sun first 
estimated by Archimedes (2002), but also a symbolic act performed not for the 
inhabitants of Venus, but fellow cold warriors across the Iron Curtain. Although the 
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Soviets were secretive,  
this boundary line bristling with barbed wire runs through the psyche of modern 
man . . . to apostrophize the capitalism of the one and the communism of the other 
as the very devil, so as to fascinate the outward eye and prevent it from looking 
within. (Jung, 2010, pp. 36-37)  
It is appropriate that the first interstellar words were meant to be listened to across the 
Iron Curtain by members of the human race, since the history of space exploration is 
deeply aligned with the history of two competing superpowers fighting not only for 
political, military, and industrial supremacy, but also the hearts and minds of the earth's 
own sentient creatures. Their weapons were Capitalism and Communism, rival 
worldviews vying to dominate the other, desperate to prove that history was on its side, 
that its piety of inevitable progress would lead to Utopia more quickly than the other. 
 But all this may be myth. The story of Evpatoria's Morse message is absent from 
NASA's official history of the Soviet space program, and the only source documenting its 
existence comes from the Russian Astronomical Society. Even after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, some adaptive preference formation may have been necessary to revise the 
historical record, to subtly shift the means to achieve the veneer of inevitable outcomes, 
to maintain the Society's conception of its historical progress. Even Alexander L. Zaitsev 
(2011a), Chief Scientist of the Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics at the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, makes no mention of the Morse message in his own 
history of Messaging to Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence (METI). He awards the honour of 
"first deliberate interstellar radio message" to Arecibo, transmitted in 1974 from Puerto 
Rico and created by Americans Frank Drake and Carl Sagan (Zaitsev, 2011a, p. 400). 
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Aimed at globular star cluster M13 25,000 light years away, the message in binary code 
is divided into several sections, meant to be read from the top down. If extraterrestrials 
will ever receive it, the first disclosures of humanity they will collect, and by implication 
our most cherished disclosures, will be the numbers 1-10 and the atomic numbers of 
DNA. After this, 30 pixels graphically arrange our human form (Sagan, 1980, p. 290). 
We stand at the centre of our world and the solar system, but we are first made of 
hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and phosphorus, those things that outlive us and give 
no qualities of humanity's social condition. This message says nothing of our individual 
agencies, our irrational desires, our need for love, and our all-too-human realization that 
we die. 
 As we are increasingly defining ourselves not only as global citizens, but also 
"citizens of the universe" (Harrison, 2011, p. 502), investigating the content of interstellar 
messaging since Arecibo will help to view ourselves from the outside in. Like Hannah 
Arendt (1998) in her work The Human Condition, I wish to find the Archimedean 
position, to see humans as objects, rather than subjects, as sentient beings from another 
world would perceive. The history of METI provides a ready-made Rorschach Test to at 
least try to answer the deepest questions we can ask ourselves in our contemporary 
epoch. In a time of soft relativism, of decentredness and fragmentation, let us challenge 
ourselves to make concrete those tenets which still unite us. What is the shared condition 
of modern humanity? What values do we hold which define us as modern rather than 
premodern, values held so deeply we keep too abstracted and ethereal to be questioned? 
 In the field of education, this philosophical investigation is important because 
teaching without awareness is a form of indoctrination. As political theorist Margaret 
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Canovan (1974) warns, "It is all too common for men to believe earnestly in doctrines 
which almost all their everyday experience contradicts" (p. 53).1 These covert tenets of 
modernity are important to recognize, to come to terms with, or to reject entirely, because 
they are the meta-values of education. To pass them on without awareness undermines 
many overt tenets most of us in the Eurocentric West hold dear to us, such as liberty, free 
inquiry, and critical thinking, which we then attempt, in the mandate of globalization, to 
persuade other societies to adopt. These covert tenets may feel to us universal, principles 
so deeply rooted in the conceptualization of the modern Self that we fail to realize their 
influence. They become the uncontested axioms of educational policy. They tell us what 
education is for, the ultimate societal aims of our institutions of learning. But we forget 
that they are constructions, values which we have formed in history, and these values are 
deeply reflected in particular social, cultural, and political conditions of the recent past, 
such as the world wars, the Cold War, globalization, the supremacy of capitalism, and 
most profoundly in our constructions of time and history. We must interrogate these 
values in order to make them relevant to us, to keep them current. If we do not hold them 
up to the mirror of reality, they can become archaic, left to petrify like material once 
organic, and, as a result, may no longer reflect our new social paradigms. If so, they must 
be abandoned or else we betray the necessity of critical inquiry we profess to hold central 
to secular education. If not, we are engaged in religious instruction, merely indoctrinating 
the secular theologies of our time. This is the central claim of this thesis.  
 After the transmission of the Arecibo message, METI researchers at NASA had 
quickly realized the communicative problems in potential transhuman discourse. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Many sources I will reference were published around 1945-1975, and therefore use the terms man and 
men to refer to humanity as a singular entity. I will do so as well for consistency's sake. I do not wish to 
imply any polemic regarding identity politics.  
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Transmitting binary code to signify mathematical instructions is relatively easy when 
compared to the task of engaging in deeper content. To express qualities of ourselves 
beyond our DNA code requires the recognition that a more complex language must be 
adopted. However, any basic assumptions we can make about sentient beings, such as 
their possession of analytical and problem-solving skills, must involve the inclusion of 
culture. If we assume extraterrestrials have mastery over their natural environment, 
which is an assumption of a necessary condition for technological advancement, then 
their cognitive abilities, like ours, will have been formed by artificial, and, therefore, 
predominantly cultural, stimuli. John W. Traphagen (2014), professor of religious 
studies, reminds us that "culture is the primary lens through which humans acquire 
sensory data and organize those data into useful patterns and systems" (p. 164). While 
there may be truly universal maxims (e.g., altruism, pain, and gratitude), they are 
communicated through culture. Therefore, messaging structurally inhabits a cultural 
context. 
 Although humankind is culturally diverse, in METI literature many thinkers 
express a need to speak for all humankind by singular representation, rather than allow a 
free-for-all multiplicity of contrasting perspectives. In his analysis of ideology, Pierre 
Bourdieu (2003) provides a framework for understanding that even within a culture of 
heterodoxy, there are tacit beliefs lurking beneath, a hegemony of tenets that is 
unquestioned precisely because it remains unquestioned. He says,  
In class societies . . . the drawing of the line between the field of opinion, of that 
which is explicitly questioned, and the field of doxa, of that which is beyond 
questions and which  each agent tacitly accords by the mere fact of acting in 
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accord with social convention, is itself a fundamental objective at stake in that 
form of class struggle, which is the struggle  for the  imposition of the dominant 
systems of classification. (p. 169) 
If ideology is a contingent fact established as necessity, then the doxa is similar to 
Friedrich Engels' "false consciousness" whereby illusory motives guide the thought 
process of the proletariat (Pines, 1993, p. 2). Louis Althusser (2014) expands Marx's 
definition of a repressive status apparatus to include "ideological state apparatuses" 
which hold a hegemony over the oppressed classes (p. 243). He cites the Church and the 
School as one of several arbiters of these apparatuses, especially the latter, since it is so 
effective that most would think of this institution as natural and neutral, purged of any 
ideology (p. 251). Therefore, many political theorists have argued that the division 
between autonomous and shared knowledge is much more blurred and indistinct than we 
would like to believe. Individual experience is "organized and constructed (re-collected) 
within the framework of an assumed, collectivized logic, which in many cases may be 
accepted as consisting of unequivocal maxims of human experience" (Traphagen, 2014, 
p. 166).  
 Dissenters have raised their concerns, but METI scholarship has predominantly 
focused on finding the common ground among competing conceptions of humanity so 
that this singular ideology, or collectivized logic, may be transmitted to extraterrestrials. 
Therefore, attempts to create a coherent message offer us a practical application of the 
theoretical frameworks offered by Bourdieu, Engels, Marx, and Althusser. After the 
dissolution of the USSR, the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA; 2007) 
published a declaration of principles to establish a general agreement on interstellar 
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transmission to extraterrestrials. Decisions to send messages should be made by "an 
appropriate international body, broadly representative of Humankind . . . [and] the 
content of such a message should be developed through an appropriate international 
process, reflecting a broad consensus . . . [of the] interests and well-being of Humankind" 
(IAA, 2007, p. 4). In fact, Michael A. G. Michaud (2003), former chairperson at IAA, 
argues that reflecting diversity may be "bad policy" because it may inhibit "rational 
dialogue" with extraterrestrials (p. 131). Kathryn Denning (2011) argues that METI is a 
"technologically mediated manifestation of our drive to represent ourselves" (p. 239). 
While the content of earlier transmissions, such as the Arecibo message, was decided by 
small groups of experts, NASA created the Earth Speaks project in 2009 to encourage 
global discussion on future messaging. Psychological researchers have performed textual 
analyses of 995 submissions to ascertain patterns of cultural identification. The largest 
word concepts were We and Earth, which were represented "at a rate that is more than 
eleven times and seventy-three times respectively more frequent than the base frequency 
for these word concepts as found in the British National Corpus" (Lower, Vakoch, 
Clearwater, Niles, & Scanlin, 2011, p. 345). The largest message-theme was the sentence, 
We are humans of the planet Earth (Lower et al., 2011, p. 344). Researchers concluded 
that the Earth Speaks project serves as an assessment of "species-level self-identification" 
and an expression of "our common identity as human beings" (Lower et al., 2011, p. 
351).  
 Implicit in this messaging is the assumption that alien culture will be culturally 
unified (like our attempts at transmission), which suggests that our conception of 
progress, or cultural evolution, leads inexorably towards homogeneity. John W. 
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Traphagen (2014) asserts that this assumption "derives from human, and particularly 
Western, perspectives that reflect a teleological notion of cultural evolution in which 
there is a universal outcome to processes of cultural change" (p. 169). In the postmodern 
21st century, we experience the currents of cultural and identity multiplicity, 
diversification, and fragmentation, but there are compelling arguments that we still accept 
as doxa that all cultures will eventually coalesce into a unified monoculture. Take the 
creed of globalization, for instance. Chris Hedges (2009a) argues that the corporate 
oligarchy in the United States uses this term as a means to engage in a form of neo-
feudalism, since in a global marketplace the American underclass must compete with 
sweat shop workers in Bangladesh or prison labour in China. Other political theorists and 
economists have made similar claims that economic globalization is a unifying force 
under the veneer of diversity. Thomas Piketty (2014), in his monumental work Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century, provides breathtaking empirical evidence that there are "major 
defects" in the theoretical belief that investing in poorer countries abroad should lead to 
"convergence of rich and poor countries and an eventual reduction of inequalities through 
market forces and competition" (p. 69). His data show that the tyranny of enforced 
market capitalism is an ideology which hides the reality of financial imperialism. 
Benjamin R. Barber (2001) terms Western consumerism as the imposition of one cultural 
value over another, a form of "neo-colonialism" (p. xvi). Therefore, my first premise 
regarding the tenets of modernity is the existence of certain homogenous meta-values 
which supercede any diverse cultural specificities. As I outline the remaining meta-
values, I hope they will not prove too controversial, because as doxa, they are principles 
we should find so benign they go unnoticed and unquestioned. 
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 The second tenet of modernity is the centrality of scientific and technological 
advancement. A fundamental rationale behind METI, and, in fact, the entire global space 
program, is to make known the material achievements of humankind, especially our 
mastery over the natural world. Alexander L. Zaitsev (2011b) argues that transmission is 
"a vital and natural need of a highly developed civilization," and isolationism may be a 
cause of the extinction of a civilization (p. 2). Note his use of the word natural. 
Paradoxically, what is natural for advanced humankind is to celebrate its capability to 
impose artificial culture and civilization onto nature. And who better to be the 
messengers than our scientists, the arbiters of artificiality whose task is to rationally know 
the natural world--and ultimately control it? Results from a survey in 2007 reveal that the 
American public believes scientists would make the best extraterrestrial communicators 
and "good-will ambassadors" with the military, private industry, religious leaders, and 
government, respectively, trailing behind (Harrison, 2011, p. 506).  
 The third tenet of modernity is the increasing centrality of economics as the 
primary means of human organization. I state increasing as a caveat for modernity is a 
historical phenomenon, and as such, is victim to various competing interpretations for 
which it stands. Enlightenment philosophy viewed liberalism as deeply imbued with 
moral import; economic progress required the intervention of moral precepts from the 
social and political realms. Karl Polanyi (2001) argues that with the rise of international 
finance in the 19th century, classic liberalism became infected with a totalizing economic 
mindset now celebrated in contemporary neoliberalism. The self-regulating market 
system became a "utopian endeavor" invested with "mythical faculties" (Polanyi, 2001, p. 
31), yet liberalism failed to recognize its role in precipitating the greatest crisis the world 
10 
 
 
had ever known: the First World War. Thus, a secular theology of progress made 
liberalism blind to its own corruption of its original tenets. This corruption required 
adaptive preference formation, a historical revisionism to maintain the myth of progress 
based solely on economic tenets. The philosophy of Adam Smith (2000/2002) provides 
an apt example. While "modern ideologists of the market continue to claim Smith as a 
prophet of ultra-liberalism" (McNally, 1993, p. 44), Polanyi (2001) claims that "no 
misreading of the past ever proved more prophetic of the future" (p. 43). He reminds us 
that notions of progress before the rise of international finance were relegated to the 
realms of political, intellectual, and spiritual (p. 47). David McNally (1993) argues that 
Smith scholarship bifurcated around in the early 19th century between those who justified 
poor working conditions and living standards among labour as inevitable, and those who 
criticized these inhumane outcomes of the market system (p. 43). He charges the former 
interpretation, held by free market ideologues, such as Hayek, as "a wholesale 
vulgarization of Smith's thought" (p. 45). Smith never intended for his ideas to simply 
trump currently held liberalist ethics; a deep, unresolved tension permeates all of his 
works, including The Wealth of Nations (2000) and A Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(2002), between morality and market behaviour. Progress was never to be defined as 
basely as the right to pursue unhindered economic transactions; it was to be achieved by 
tempering such forces by participatory democracy.  
 This revisionism of Smith is typical of neoliberal ahistoricism, which aims for the 
total "erasure of memory" (as cited in Klein, 2008, p. 557). Like other theologies, 
neoliberalism desires "unattainable purity, a clean slate on which to build a re-engineered 
model society" (Klein, 2008, p. 24). A state of pure capitalism, devoid of human 
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interferences, requires the total absence of governmental regulation, which is justified by 
its naturalness. Klein argues, "The core of such sacred Chicago teachings was that the 
economic forces of supply, demand, inflation and unemployment were like the forces of 
nature, fixed and unchanging" (p. 58). Milton Friedman's negative freedom is as illusory 
and utopian as Marxism, yet it borrows heavily from the frontier psyche of American 
exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny, making it as American as apple pie. Therefore, 
modernity and neoliberalism share precepts, such as Man as an economic creature, but 
neoliberalism may be interpreted as a historical mutation of modernity. Although difficult 
to date, the mainstream acceptance of anti-Keynesian economic policies of the Chicago 
School as a response to the 1970s oil crisis and the application of these policies in Reagan 
and Thatcher of the 1980s may be broadly accepted as a turning point in mainstream 
conceptions of modernity, when neoliberalism took over ideological hegemony in our 
contemporary culture. 
 In neoliberal economic theory, humankind is essentially predictive and, therefore, 
shares conditioned behaviours, such as the maxim that individuals respond to incentives. 
Therefore, humans may be calculated as rational commodities, or human capital. Tal 
Gilead (2012) posits that human capital theory rests on two assumptions: that preferences 
are stable, and that preferences are certain (p. 119). Like Ivan Pavlov's dog or B. F. 
Skinner's conditioning chamber, these maxims of human behaviour take as a given that 
free will is ultimately illusory, or at least not as totalizing as we would believe. As H. 
MacCartney (April 18, 2014), professor of economics at Duke University, admits, his 
discipline is a social science that desires to study humans scientifically (personal 
communication). Neoliberal economics is related to scientific organization by treating 
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individuals as objects of processes rather than autonomous beings. While both 
communism and capitalism are "materialist Utopias offering rival versions of an earthly 
paradise" (Wright, 2004, p. 124), they both betray Man as an economic creature (Norris, 
2011, p. 21). The cold warriors on both sides of the Space Race would have admitted this 
common ground, although their aspirations of human organization were radically 
opposing. After the collapse of the USSR, capitalism became the ipso facto model for the 
ideal political order, and with that were imbued those political values we hold dear to us 
in the West, including democracy, negative freedom, and the rise of the nation-state 
(since communism is ultimately a universalist worldview). We think of concepts of 
freedom and capitalism as inevitable in the material progress of humankind. Albert A. 
Harrison (2014), who researches the societal dimensions of METI, recently argued that 
"long-lived societies are democratic, peaceful, and enduring, [while] self-serving, 
authoritarian, and aggressive societies inevitably collapse" (p. 184). By this reasoning, 
politics becomes the slave to economics, since the best means for governing a society can 
be found in a model of rational human behaviour which purports to be universal, 
predictive, and value-neutral. All modes of thinking become subsumed by scientific, 
positivist thought or else deemed meaningless. An example would be logical positivism 
and language. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno 
(2002) reject the positivist commodification of language:  
If the only obstacles were those arising from the oblivious instrumentalization of 
science, thought about social questions could at least attach itself to tendencies 
opposed to official science. Those tendencies, too, however, are caught up in the 
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general process of production. They have changed no less than the ideology they 
attacked. (p. xv) 
As a result, thought is deprived "of the conceptual language of opposition" (Horkheimer 
& Adorno, 2002, p. xv) and, thus, in the modern age "the hygienic factory is bought with 
the melting down of all cultural entities in the gigantic crucible" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 
2002, p. xvii). If moral judgments find no place in positivist, value-neutral, objective 
discourse, then humans are robbed of the tools to dissent. I will come back to this point 
later. 
  The fourth tenet of modernity is the belief in a historical and conceptual schism 
between premodernity and modernity. Our understanding of scientific, technological, and 
economic advancement can only be maintained if there existed a time and place in which 
these systems were not yet advanced. Our core identity as moderns is predicated on the 
assumption that we are no longer premodern. In his work We Have Never Been Modern, 
Bruno Latour (1993) makes a similar claim: "The modern passage of time is nothing but 
a particular form of historicity. Where do we get the idea of time that passes? From the 
modern Constitution itself" (p. 68). Within this belief are fundamental conceptions of 
linear time and progress. 
 To summarize, I postulate these four tenets as the meta-values of modernity: (a) 
the existence of certain homogenous meta-values which supercede any diverse cultural 
specificities, (b) the centrality of scientific and technological advancement, (c) the 
increasing centrality of economics as the primary means of human organization, and (d) 
the belief in a historical and conceptual schism between premodernity and modernity. 
Although I have introduced them using the Rorshach Test of extraterrestrial 
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communication as a starting point, there has been a broad consensus among many 
thinkers in various disciplines since the early 19th century that these are the fundamental 
conditions of modernity. I will refer to these thinkers throughout this thesis, including: 
Karl Marx, Louis Althusser, Pierre Bourdieu, and Thomas Piketty (in economics); Eric 
Voegelin, Sheldon Wolin, Chris Hedges, and Noam Chomsky (in politics); W. V. O. 
Quine, Hilary Putnam, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Bruno Latour (in the history and 
philosophy of science); Auguste Comte, Max Weber, and Zygmunt Bauman (in 
sociology); Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung (in psychology); Michael W. Apple, Gert 
Biesta, Kenneth Howe, and Diane Ravitch (in education); Aldous Huxley, George 
Orwell, and Terry Eagleton (in literature); and critical theorists of the Frankfurt School 
such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse (in sociology).  
 Before moving further, I wish to explicitly state my commitments to modernity, 
critical theory, and postmodernity. My overall concern is to essentially save modernity 
from itself as it is misappropriated in educational policy. Where once modernity turned 
its critical gaze outward towards theocracy and the divine right of kings, now more than 
ever it must turn inwards to critique its own presuppositions and reveal its protean and 
historically-changing tenets. Reason is a sacred privilege of the human condition, yet the 
empty rhetoric of science, technology, and economics in educational policy reveals 
presuppositions of modernity that rather than encourage the application of modernity's 
commitment to critique, become the means by which thoughtfulness is discouraged. 
Modernity in educational policy is unreason disguised as reason, theology sanctified by 
the language of the secular. While schools of thought differ in terms of the relationship 
between critical theory and postmodernism, I wish to make no distinction between the 
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two conceptual, historical modes of thought. I will borrow from both disciplines as 
ammunition against the misappropriation of modernity in our contemporary culture. 
 Of all the thinkers previously mentioned, I am most indebted to the political 
thought of Hannah Arendt (1998), who proposes in her work The Human Condition 
"nothing more than to think what we are doing" (p. 5). More deeply than any other 
theorist, Arendt (1998) stresses the moral imperative for us not only to think, but to act in 
our world, and puts front and centre the moral consequences of the thoughtlessness which 
gives rise to the individual state of alienation and loneliness. A stark reminder of this 
aspect of the modern condition is reflected in the Earth Speaks messages: many 
submissions were simply asking for help (Lower et al., 2011, p. 342). Researchers 
concluded that there is a widespread hope that those nonhuman creatures thousands of 
light years in the distance will "provide [us] with the knowledge necessary to overcome 
the contemporary global climate of human-caused fear, loneliness, and violence" (Lower 
et al., 2011, p. 351). It is a sad paradox that our attempts to reach the Archimedean point 
and make contact with extraterrestrials may deflate our core values of cultural 
advancement. Contact may reveal how primitive we are in relation to the sentient Other. 
In an age where science, technology, and economics provide the tools to improve our 
material conditions, we also use these to build gas chambers and weapons of mass 
destruction, thereby potentially destroying what we hold most precious to us. As the 
Earth Speaks analysis illustrates, we are still living in an "age of anxiety," a term coined 
by W. H. Auden (1947) over 60 years ago. Loneliness is a chief characteristic of our 
times, and we have a moral dictate to investigate its causes or risk betraying the necessity 
of critical inquiry we profess to embrace as central to modern education. Can we place at 
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least some blame on the very utopian values by which we unquestionably define 
ourselves? Do our conceptions of time, history, and progress provide clues? Are these 
conceptions so rooted in our identity as moderns that they have become theologies, even 
in our allegedly secular existences?  
The Edifice of Time 
 Classical antiquity, the progenitor of modern Western civilization, had a very 
different conception of time. It was cyclical. Nature lay outside the realm of the gods, and 
man came into being in nature. Therefore, an individual is remembered because he 
interrupts, in the words of Arendt (1958), this "eternal quiet of being-forever" (p. 572), 
breaking the bounds of immortality and achieving fame precisely by his own mortality, 
"the hallmark of human existence" (p. 571). Man is the only being who can move beyond 
the cyclical processes of life in a rectilinear movement, like a line puncturing a circle. 
This worldview puts the individual at its centre; he is not victim to the dictates of his 
society, or the inevitability of historical change. He is the agent for historical change, not 
its process. Society is not an artifice in opposition to nature. By contrast, our modern 
worldview based on Cartesian dualism (despite Heidegger's (2010) phenomenological 
ontology and the postmodernist project) divides man, the subject, from nature, the object.  
 Arendt (1958) reminds us that this modern worldview is painfully outdated, 
though. Even in 1958 she recognized the heresy of adopting this rhetoric of scientism in 
the face of 20th century insight. The 19th century concept of "absolute objectivity and 
precision of the natural sciences is today a thing of the past" (Arendt, 1958, p. 577). 
Arendt (1958) attributes the discovery that the earth revolves around the sun as the 
threshold of the modern world, since this betrays the observation of sense experience (p. 
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257). Galileo was the first modern, and the telescope was the first modern technology. 
However, a recognition of this subjectivism may lead one to perhaps feel "imprisoned in 
a non-world of meaningless sensations that no reality and no truth can penetrate" (Arendt, 
1958, p. 584). Therefore, the Enlightenment project, which affirms the objectivity of 
man's senses and the confidence that man can ultimately know and thereby control the 
objects of nature, coincides and makes strange bedfellows with this inherent subjectivity 
in modern science. Yet, we often choose to abide by the myths of rationality, positivism, 
and objectivity found in the Enlightenment without recognizing them as such, and most 
insidiously these myths encroach into our conception of historical and social change. 
Like our belief that Ideas evolve and lead us towards more understanding of the world, by 
implication we assume that society follows the same trajectory. Where does this value 
find its genesis? What conditions create the fiction of man's self-proclaimed god-like 
status as master of Nature, but also impotent to the processes of the collective, reified 
Man? Why do we believe we are conditioned by history, hatched and decanted by 
historical forces beyond our reach, like the citizens of the World State in the dystopian 
utopia Brave New World? 
 Perhaps it was Plato, the father of Western philosophical writing. He was "the 
first to design a blueprint for the making of political bodies [and] has remained the 
inspiration for all later utopias" (Arendt, 1998, p. 227). He set down rules for the 
perfection of society. In his famous analogy, we have been imprisoned in a cave since 
childhood, and it is the duty of learned men to enlighten, rather than corrupt, the minds of 
youth, to show them the shadows made by the fire and ultimately the sunlight outside. In 
Plato's world, a perfect circle can be imagined, while representations of circles (the 
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shadows) are degraded copies of the perfect form. Therefore, those who can recognize 
the true Forms must be the elite who rule over others, in a relationship derived from the 
master and slave (Arendt, 1998, p. 224). For Arendt (1998), 
the Platonic identification of knowledge with command and rulership and of 
action  with obedience and execution overruled all earlier experiences and 
articulations in the political realm and became authoritative for the whole 
tradition of political thought, even after the roots of experience from which Plato 
derived his concepts had long been forgotten. (p. 225) 
 With the gradual dissolution of Rome, the belief in a material immortality 
manifested in objects, including most of all in the corporeal public realm which preserves 
the memory of man's actions, became increasingly challenged by the emergence of 
Judaeo-Christian doctrine (Canovan, 1974, p. 84). Norman F. Cantor (1994) argues that 
for Plato, salvation lay in man's ability to know the eternal Idea, but for the Jewish 
people, their God was an interlocutor of history: 
In the static Greek view of the universe, perfect forms had always existed and 
would  always exist, so real change was not possible. In the Hebrew view, on the 
other hand, God existed before the world began (He created it), but He acts in our 
lives through history. God set up a drama in which men participate; He directs the 
course of human history. (p. 23) 
Eschatology, the theology of finality, a derivation of the ancient Greek word eschaton 
meaning end time, became an increasingly obsessive occupation in Hebrew scholarship, 
especially after the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem in 70 A. D. (Cantor, 1994, p. 
24). The ancient Jewish people found solace in perpetual reform and the gradual 
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perfection of human society in history. There was not only a material dimension to this; 
they ascribed to a moral attitude that as the Chosen People, servants of God's ultimate 
plan, "an unjust situation would be made just" for them but also for all of humankind 
(Cantor, 1994, p. 24). Norman Cohn (1961) argues that the earliest traces of 
supranational totalitarianism find their genesis in the millenarian thinking of this attitude. 
He says, "At least since the days of the prophets they had been convinced that Yahweh 
was no mere national god, however powerful, but the one and only God, the omnipotent 
Lord of History who controlled the destinies of all nations" (p. 1). 
 In Western Christendom, we must remind ourselves that so much orthodoxy we 
attribute as scriptural can, in fact, be attributed to the writings of the earliest Church 
Fathers. Saint Augustine's views on time, history, and progress lent credence to 
subsequent theological thought through the ages. To this he devotes the last three 
chapters of City of God (2003), a work somewhat of an inversion of Plato's The Republic 
(2007). While his work is squarely Neo-Platonist, it celebrates a gnostic, inward 
contemplation of God whereby one must turn away from the public realm. Most 
importantly, Augustine claims that since sin originated in history (as Original Sin after 
the Fall), "only through history do persons develop their full potential as true images of 
God" (Clark, 2005, p. 106). Millenarian and apocalyptic concerns run rampant in City of 
God. The crucible of Christian eschatology is the Incarnation of Christ, and since this is a 
unique historical event, so will all future events. Cantor (1994) argues,  
Augustine's affirmation of the Judaic linear historical concept (as against the 
Greek) has an enormous social impact. . . The primordial western cast of mind 
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sees men marching toward a glorious future through the dregs of the present; 
belief in progress is the very heart of western thought. (p. 77) 
The desire for perfection is distinctive--a quality of the Western mind. The 
Enlightenment heavily borrowed the eschatological worldview of early Judaism and 
Christianity and knowingly supplanted it onto the material conditions of human societies. 
In fact, the chief characteristic of rationality, a central tenet of Enlightenment thought, is 
the ability to make progress, to set a clear and specific future objective, and to 
sequentially and discretely move towards this objective (Fuller, 2007, p. 128). But what 
is deeply insidious about this displacement of progress from the mystical to the secular is 
we forget its conceptual inheritance. Augustine was concerned with the soul of Man, and 
his mission as a moral one. He would be probably horrified to see his message sanitized 
of its value judgments by the adoption of illusory objectivism, positivism, and neutrality. 
And it is dangerous to fail to recognize this mythic inheritance, what Max Weber (2006) 
calls "the ghost of dead religious beliefs" (p. 124), because it is too easy to position 
ourselves as the godhead. 
 Throughout the medieval period, though, there was a contradictory but accepted 
paradox in the nature of eschatological versus material or social time. Medieval 
Christians were devout in the conviction that the Church would one day become 
universal (Cantor, 1994, p. 26). However, historians have argued that to the medieval 
mind, material progress was anathema to this eschatological concern. Man may increase 
in his personal virtue, but “betterment of the whole world would have to await the Second 
Coming and the beginning of a new age” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 54). According to 
Augustine, Man had free will but only a limited capacity: enough to choose or reject 
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God’s grace. Therefore, a conception of historical change as linear time was largely 
absent because God ultimately determines the path of mankind. William Manchester 
(1993) even asserts that the medieval mind did not perceive of material time as divided 
into past, present, and future, since corporeal life was quantified by the cyclical passing 
of seasons and annual religious holidays, for instance (p. 22). Although he may be 
stressing this point a bit too far, perhaps to contrast this conception to that of the 
Renaissance mind, it helps us to give pause and reflect upon a time when the technology 
of keeping time was never experienced apart from a local Easter calendar. Norman Cohn 
(1961) argues that beginning in the 11th century, those social mechanisms which 
“precluded any radical disorientation” of the peasant began to diminish with the 
emergence of institutional commerce (p. 18). Capitalism, albeit in a primitive form when 
compared to today, was still a modernizing force because it provided for the peasant at 
least fantasies of upward social mobility. The Third Estate (as the French revolutionaries 
later termed it) began to chip away at the stratified hierarchy of the feudal system.  
Capitalism and the technological development it precipitated were the tools which 
facilitated the displacement of religious progress onto historical progress. Take the clock, 
for instance. Before around 1600, the English apprehended the regulation of time by 
hearing the bells of the local church that divided it into uneven hours (MacGregor, 2012, 
p. 219). A minute would have only been an abstract idea and never physically 
experienced, much like our understanding of nanoseconds today. By the mid-17th 
century, minute hands became standard in clocks. David Harvey (1989) argues that new 
perspectivism, illustrated in mechanical, discrete time, and the science of optics, 
influenced modernity's compression of time and space; it "provided an effective material 
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foundation for the Cartesian principles of rationality that became integrated into the 
Enlightenment project" (p. 245). He echoes Bourdieu's suggestion that "spatial and 
temporal experiences are primary vehicles for the coding and reproduction of social 
relations" (as cited in Harvey, 1989, p. 247), primarily the domination of the natural 
world, a necessary precondition of modern capitalism. There is a limit to the effective 
organization of people if nature remains out of control. Harvey elaborates,  
The economic conditions of the European Enlightenment contributed in no 
uncertain measure to the sense of common objectives. Increased competition 
between states and other economic units created pressure to rationalize and co-
ordinate the space and time of economic activity . . . All economic units were 
caught up in a world of increasing competition in which the stakes were 
ultimately economic success. (p. 259) 
By the 19th century, it is clear that technological revolutions, aided by capitalism, led to 
revolutions in thought. Neil MacGregor (2010) cites ship chronometers as an example of 
this partnership: 
The chronometer for the first time allowed absolutely accurate charting of the 
oceans, with all that implied for establishing safe and rapid shipping routes. It was 
another great step in the Enlightenment project of mapping -- and therefore 
controlling -- the world. (p. 597)  
He further discusses the use of the chronometer in Darwin’s HMS Beagle (and by proxy 
his theory of evolution) and the standardization of Greenwich Mean Time as establishing 
the objectivity of time. He says, "the measurement of time had been severed from the 
natural cycle of days and seasons" (MacGregor, 2010, p. 598).  
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 It may seem sheer lunacy to question the objectivity of time, even if one traces the 
social historiography of its conception. To undermine its legitimacy may feel perhaps a 
marker of psychosis. However, because all cultures in all periods take as a given the 
universality and experience of time, it provides for us fertile ground to investigate how 
competing conceptions of time are influenced by their historical and social contexts. 
Time is the most common noun in the English language, with year placing third, and day 
placing fifth (Oxford University Press, 2014). It is, therefore, an ideal concept, in the 
words of Stephen Kern (2003), "to interpret how class structures, modes of production, 
patterns of diplomacy, or means of waging war were manifested historically in terms of 
changing experiences of time and space" (p. 4). In the modern age, it is useful to begin in 
the field of psychology, for it offers a perspective of lived time that is at odds with our 
rational self and collapses our built edifices between reason and insanity. The case of 
Daniel Paul Schreber is the most frequently cited in the history of psychoanalytic 
literature (as cited in Labbie & Uebel, 2010, p. 128). A German judge who suffered from 
dementia, Schreber (2000) believed he communicated directly with God by experiencing 
His nerves and rays, and wrote his experiences in his book Memoirs of my Nervous 
Illness in 1884. What is most fascinating about his writing is that he adopts the lucidity of 
scientific discourse. He clearly desires to be legitimized by rational means, like the 
medieval apologists who desired to apply rationality to the unreason of faith to prove 
God’s existence. However, Erin Labbie and Michael Uebel argue that Schreber’s special 
role as divine receiver positions him as the antithesis of modernity, since he desires “not 
to fill traditional spiritual forms with a modern secular content” but spiritual forms with 
spiritual forms (p. 129). As medieval scholars, they position his experiences with the 
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premodern, and argue that the popularity of such texts by mentally ill persons are a means 
by which we can amuse ourselves by experiencing what we believe we are not: 
 modernity contrasts itself to the barbarism (and innocence) and presumed 
illegitimacy of the Middle Ages. In this case the idealization of science asserts the 
supremacy of the technological progress of modernity over what is seen to be an 
archaic premodern culture. (Labbie & Uebel, 2010, p. 133)  
Like the Savage paraded for the civilized in Brave New World, we take refuge in 
the conviction that we know better and feel secure in taking delight in Schreber’s blurring 
of premodern and modern time. However, Freud (1973) found many temporal distortions 
in the fantasies of many of his patients, and even defined the dream state as “a process of 
fragmentation in which chronological relations in particular are neglected” (p. 252). Jung 
(1968), in his most accessible text written for the layperson, argued that neurotic 
phenomena are “no more than pathological exaggerations of normal occurrences” (p. 20). 
This questioning of our preconceptions of time is actually a trait in the art of modernism, 
experienced in many cultural forms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The 
unconscious took centre stage when we transitioned from what Lewis Mumford (1962) 
termed the age of confidence to the age of violence. Artistic expression reflected the 
crisis of representation in this period of cultural war with the old regime. The increasing 
prevalence of public time, due to the centralization of industry and government, created a 
rupture with private time (Kern, 2003, p. 34). Individuals would increasingly retreat into 
the sanctity of their own personal realm of subjectivity, perhaps in an attempt to be secure 
in at least knowing themselves in an age of such angst and tension. Scientific discoveries 
that undermined the preconceived markers of time’s succession, such as Einstein’s theory 
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of relativity, challenged the Newtonian paradigm and propelled cultural anxieties which 
were reflected in the literature of the period, such as works by Joyce and Proust (Kern, 
2003, p. 19). Arendt (1973) famously argued that Nazism as a totalitarian movement was 
fundamentally modern, but it was also atavistic, primitive, and archaic, spouting rhetoric 
of the Fatherland and an image of the glorious pretechnological past, even appropriating 
eugenic theory, which was mildly outdated and unfashionable by the 1930s. Nazism was 
a contradiction of composite of myths “in opposition to the rational utilitarianism of 
Enlightenment thought” (Harvey, 1989, p. 277), but also a utopian movement of the 
inevitability of progress, touting claims of a Thousand Year Reich. The Entartete Kunst 
exhibition of 1937 attempted to show to the German volk how deeply the art of modernity 
reflected degeneration, a moving backwards in time rather than forwards. The Nazis 
sought to reclaim the past and fuse it to their version of the present and future.  
After the horrors of the Second World War, cultural thought has been dominated 
by postmodernism, which threatens to undermine the presuppositions of linear time and 
the rational evolution of human society which many believe were catalysts for the loss of 
over 50 million lives. David Harvey (1989) characterizes this movement as 
“[f]ragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust of all universal or ‘totalizing’ 
discourses” (p. 9). Following the paradigms of early 20th century art, notions of cyclical 
and repetitive time in private life provided for the individual a “perpetual counterpoint to 
progress” which is “the compelling image of some stable university propensity” (Harvey, 
1989, p. 202). Harvey uses the example of neo-classical economic rhetoric. To defer 
gratification is touted as a virtue in conservative thought, since it encourages fiscal 
autonomy and personal responsibility, while simultaneously debt is lauded as 
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characteristic of growth and prosperity (Harvey, 1989, p. 202). However, this unresolved, 
contradictory, and diverse conception of relative time is ultimately subsumed by the 
tendency to objectify time, even in our postmodern condition: “there is still a tendency to 
regard the differences as those of perception or interpretation of what should 
fundamentally be understood as a single, objective yardstick of time's ineluctable arrow 
of motion" (Harvey, 1989, p. 203). Like Kern (2003), Harvey recognizes that these 
objective qualities of time are not independent of material historical processes, such as 
the capitalist mode of production, which require faith in “the advance of knowledge 
(scientific, technical, administrative, bureaucratic, and rational” (Harvey, 1989, p. 204).  
 In education, we must not fail to recognize the material conditions which give rise 
to competing and dominant conceptions of time. This veneer of collective consensus 
disguises the edifice of cultural time. One of my central arguments in this thesis is that 
when a certain variety postmodernism is largely rejected in higher education, or at least 
only paid lip service, it can result in education as indoctrination. The meaning of 
postmodernism is notoriously difficult to pin down, but I am concerned here specifically 
with its allowance of epistemological subjectivity. Of course, modernity can strive for 
this as well, but modernity as it is conceptually framed in contemporary education is 
often an ossified version of itself, becoming dogmatic of certain axioms. Critical theory, 
which seeks to subvert the epistemological bases of modernist knowledge, is absent from 
educational discourse; and, therefore, the tenets of modernity, those meta-values of 
educational policy, are left unquestioned and remain as absolutes, myths that stand 
outside the topics of postmodernist inquiry. Only identity politics takes centre stage, such 
as issues of race, gender, and class. These are important discussions to have, but they are 
27 
 
 
not enough to question more fundamental axioms of human organization. For instance, to 
celebrate ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead one to undermine the claims of neo-
classical economic theory. As I will discuss in the next chapter, the "boutique activism" 
(Hedges, 2011a, p. 8) of diversity and multiculturalism, for instance, adopts language that 
so many would accept at face value, and, therefore, is sanitized of the subversive (and 
most effective) qualities of postmodernism. The myths of modernity remain, especially 
our faith in scientific, technical, and economic advancement, for these myths act as 
superstructures which supersede the divisive particulars of identity politics. These 
superstructures insist upon our cultural constructions of objective, discrete, linear time. It 
seems sanitary to call students “human capital” since it takes as a given that our 
postproductivist economy is an inevitable outgrowth of social advancement, in which 
labour skills, manifested in the human, are the new machines of economic progress. But 
this has deep moral repercussions, which will be investigated in the next chapter. For 
now, we must interrogate the tyranny of progress in order to topple the conceptual 
foundations of what we believe is the social advancement of modernity. 
Kuhn, Genocide, and the Collapse of Moral Progress 
 The most obvious objection to a critique of progress is to refer to the material 
benefits we enjoy by the cumulative processes of scientific innovation and technological 
application. It is a story we have heard since childhood: one discovery gave rise to 
another, knowledge compounded upon itself, and sequentially we have evolved from the 
depths of barbarity towards the enlightened Utopia. It is obviously better (for some) to 
live in the 21st century West than in any other period in history. At the turn of the 20th 
century, life expectancy in the developed nations of Britain and Germany was only 
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around 45 years (Hicks & Allen, 1999, p. 8). While material advancement due to 
scientific discovery seems the most apparent testament to human progress, Thomas Kuhn 
(2012), in his famous work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, provides a 
historiography of scientific thought which undermines the belief that scientific 
advancement consists of a series of discoveries that is unbroken, continuous, and 
cumulative. He argues that this narrative hides persistent anomalies that continue after 
each subsequent advance. His insistence upon these anomalies does not necessarily 
undermine the notion of progress, since there can be material improvement by a new 
scientific discovery, but rather this perspective that one paradigm may not in fact improve 
upon the one it displaces supports my critique of scientific progress. Scientific discovery 
moves in a clunky process of shifting paradigms. Facts do not accumulate without the 
acceptance of these facts in culture. For instance, one discovery leaves its own gaps in 
theory. The very framework of this new account of knowledge establishes parameters 
which become important for the theory. Therefore, what subsequent scientists desire to 
measure, and deem important to measure, is delineated by the existing theory. 
Essentially, we view the world through paradigms. We might accept this more easily in 
the field of art history, but what was so scandalous about his work when it was published 
was that he applied it to the story of scientific progress. Kuhn posits that we tend to resist 
paradigm shifting. For example, if counter-evidence falsifies a prediction, this new 
evidence will be disregarded in favour of explaining the counter-evidence using the 
preexisting paradigm; it is only when the old paradigm begins to continually break down 
do scientists resolve this crisis and substitute a new paradigm. This is necessary for 
engaging in what Kuhn terms "normal science" (p. 10), which he asserts is the beauty of 
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scientific experimentation. Preexisting structures of thought are necessary to engage in 
practical inquiry. I will argue against the encroachment of older paradigms of progress, 
such as the narrative of scientific advancement Kuhn seeks to undermine, when it is 
appropriated by nonscientific disciplines, such as education, English, history, and 
economics. I reject the empty rhetoric of science and those who abuse its semiotic weight 
and mistakenly believe its epistemological method self-evidently dominates other modes 
of thinking. Too often to the nonscientists, older paradigms become ossified as myths, 
and these myths must suffer the attacks of critical inquiry like anything else. 
 Karl Popper (1950), another philosopher of science, warns us that absolutist 
systems of epistemology contribute to a viewpoint that can lead to totalitarianism (p. 
viii). In fact, what demarcates science as scientific is not its claim to uncontested 
objectivity, but rather its ability to be falsified. Popper (1962) says, "A theory which is 
not refutable by any conceivable means is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a 
theory (as people often think) but a vice" (p. 36). Scientific inquiry must be 
antiauthoritarian, and like Arendt, he cites Plato's ideas of the utopian political 
community as progenitors of totalitarian thought (Popper, 1950, p. 86). There is nothing 
inherently sinister about utopias per se, but it can lead towards ahistorical thinking. If we 
do not accept Kuhn's (2012) claims, we are at risk of assuming that scientific judgments 
must trump the authority of their predecessors. Claims to knowledge, to know the world 
correctly and objectively, is deeply imbued with mastery, the will to dominate and 
control. Popper (1962) takes lessons from history to argue that the "authoritarian spirit" 
of this mode of thinking has disastrous consequences when it is transferred to political 
theory (p. 25). Asking for sources of knowledge which leave no room for error is a 
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dangerous path of inquiry; instead, he suggests we replace it with the question, "How can 
we organize our political institutions so that bad or incompetent rulers . . . cannot do too 
much damage?" (p. 25). Do not look for certainty because that is not scientific. However, 
as T. Norris (February 27, 2014) notes, Popper's attempt to tie Plato to totalitarianism is 
perhaps a bit too naive, and thus this attitude towards scientific method Kuhn might find 
problematic (personal communication).   
 Nevertheless, this insidious line of authoritarian thinking supports myth-making 
because if we assume that we are entirely shaped by history and society, and if we 
compound this with the assumption that time progresses inevitably towards advancement, 
then progress must destroy the meaningless and invalid past. History has nothing to teach 
us, then, and as tradition becomes a nasty word we take our lessons from the nonexistent 
future. As Latour (1993) argues, 
The moderns have a peculiar propensity for understanding time that passes as if it 
were really abolishing the past behind it. They all take themselves for Attila, in 
whose  footsteps no grass grows back. They do not feel that they are removed 
from the Middle Ages by a certain number of centuries, but that they are 
separated by Copernican revolutions, epistemological breaks, epistemic ruptures 
so radical that nothing of that  past survives in them -- nothing of that past ought to 
survive in them. (p. 68) 
In an age without the comfort of God (since Enlightenment thought demands man to be 
master of nature), faith in progress allows us to reposition ourselves as central to the 
upward movement of temporality towards an earthly paradise created by Man. Progress 
becomes myth. As Latour elaborates, "The asymmetry between nature and culture then 
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becomes an asymmetry between past and future. The past was the confusion of things 
and men; the future is what will no longer confuse them" (p. 71). It is a myth that denies 
itself, though, an irrationality disguised as rationality, or what Herbert Marcuse (1966), 
when speaking of advanced industrial civilization, calls "the rational character of its 
irrationality" (p. 9). If progress is inevitable, then refutation must be irrational. If society 
rules the individual, then man has no place but to retreat into his private world of 
subjectivity.  
 Aspects of irrationality disguised as rationality include the myth of total mastery. 
In his work One-dimensional Man, Marcuse (1966) argues that too often scientific 
progress is used as a tool of domination. He examines the political consequences of 
contemporary analytic philosophy's obsession with universals, such as Mind, Will, and 
Self, which then become reified in society as more human than the autonomous, free-
thinking individual. He says,  
this dissolution itself must be questioned -- not only on behalf of the philosopher, 
but on  behalf of the ordinary people in whose life and discourse such dissolution 
takes place. It  is not their own doing and their own saying; it happens to them and 
it violates them as they are compelled, by the 'circumstances', to identify their 
mind with the mental  processes, their self with the roles and functions which they 
have to perform in their society. If philosophy does not comprehend these 
processes of translation and identification as societal processes . . . philosophy 
struggles only with the ghost of the substance which it wishes to de-mystify. 
(Marcuse, 1966, p. 204)  
Marcuse stresses the need to translate those abstract nouns we anoint and capitalize as 
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proper such as Nation, Party, and Corporation, as no more than the sum of their parts (p. 
206). They are mere abstractions of cultural and historical specificities. This is my 
argument against the semantic tyranny of concepts I have previously discussed such as 
Time, History, and Progress. A central concern for many critical theorists of the Frankfurt 
School is reification the rendering into the abstract, the pulling away of ideas from the 
historical conditions which initially produce them. The language of positivism which 
facilitates this reification becomes a totalizing discourse, an ideological pathology. I am 
reminded here of Heidegger's (2010) critique of Cartesian dualism: we believe that to 
know an object fully requires the division of the subject (the individual) from the object 
(the world), but Heidegger claims that there exists a more fundamental unity between the 
two in the form of Being which we have yet to come to terms with. Before we can ask 
questions like, What is man? and What is nature?, we are already presupposing we know 
what is is. Therefore, the language of positivism is insufficient to engage in this mode of 
ontological inquiry.  
 Reification renders the individual impotent and, therefore, lacking in autonomous 
freedom. To maintain the ethos of rationality, which is the hallmark of progress and the 
means by which we reify Time, History, and Progress, we must regulate collective 
memory. Referencing the works of Durkheim and Weber, Steve Fuller (2007) writes that 
"order is maintained in the modern world by past-discounting," asserting that what we are 
now is what we wanted to be, as "compensating for the excesses of future-discounting" 
(p. 8). He criticizes most conceptions of progress because often "goals are subtly shifted 
as they are pursued" and this method "gives rise to stances of adaptive preference 
formation, whereby people come to adjust their goals to match their expectations: they 
33 
 
 
come to want what they are likely to get" (p. 128). He notes that progress is often defined 
by concepts such as wealth, truth, freedom, and equality, "which have been subject to 
various, often conflicting, interpretations throughout history" (p. 128). Therefore, the 
myth of mastery is at the heart of rational thought as it is practiced in society. 
Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) assert most scandalously in Dialectic of Enlightenment 
that "Enlightenment is totalitarian" (p. 4) because "[p]ower and knowledge are 
synonymous" (p. 2). Desire to know the unknown is predicated on the illusion that one 
has the very capacity to know the unknown, and, therefore, Enlightenment thinking taken 
to its conclusion regresses to the mythical thinking it defines itself against. Unlike 
primitive man though, in the modern age "humanity replaces the supreme deity as the 
vehicle for the ultimate realization of whether design the deity might have intended" 
(Fuller, 2007, p. 144).  
 It is important to note that Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) are not critical of 
rationality in of itself, but rather of those who adopt it without being cognizant of its 
susceptibility to irrational thinking as well. One does not have to subscribe to this belief 
to recognize that very few economists foresaw the economic crisis of 2008, for instance, 
or that very few scientists foresaw the unintended consequences of prescribing 
thalidomide to expecting mothers in the 1950s. Of course, one cannot predict the future, 
but keeping faith in the myth of mastery precludes one from acknowledging that his 
claims of objective knowledge may, in fact, be falsifiable. Horkheimer and Adorno wrote 
Dialectic of Enlightenment during the Second World War, when the technological 
commodities of scientific inquiry were being used to murder innocent civilians by the 
millions. Yet this period of the war's aftermath, when critical theorists wrote their seminal 
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works, when playwrights, such as Samuel Beckett, explored the cultural wasteland left 
over from the appropriation of art for totalitarian's dictates, when visual artists retreated 
into abstraction to look inwards at the soul of man, and when existentialism attacked the 
abstractions of human experience, was all much too short-lived. Utopian ideals of 
progress yet again entrenched themselves in the Western mind. Writing in 1968, Pollard 
discusses the collective amnesia experienced once the West found itself benefitting from 
an unprecedented growth in material prosperity and innovation. Especially in the field of 
economics, he criticizes those who had assumed that increasing wealth and the social 
changes brought upon by this development will inevitably result in all forms of 
prosperity. With regards to global economic development, he makes very prophetic 
comments that are as fiercely relevant today as they were 46 years ago:  
Among the common assumptions are the beliefs that (no matter how divergent 
their history in earlier ages), the modern stages are basically identical, and 
therefore predictable and plannable, for all humanity; that progress along this 
unlinear path of progress is both 'natural' and desirable; that once certain early 
steps are correctly taken, the developing societies will continue under their own 
steam, in inevitable 'self-sustaining' growth, and that growth will bring inevitably 
in its wake such other desireable developments as greater democracy, more 
education and a higher status in the international community. (Pollard, 1968, p. 
191)  
More recent political theorists have made similar claims including Chris Hedges (2009a), 
who terms the American state neo-feudalist, Sheldon Wolin (2008), who terms it inverted 
totalitarianism, and economist Thomas Piketty (2014), who predicts that America is 
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entering a new Gilded Age of inherited wealth and social inequality. 
 This brings us to another aspect of irrationality disguised as rationality: the 
transposition of values relating to historical, material progress onto conceptions of moral 
progress. Enlightenment thought dislocates eschatology from its religious foundations, 
applies it to historical progress, and then maintains the myth of moral progress even when 
it positions Man as the godhead (Voegelin, 1952). Arendt (1970) argues that the notion of 
"progress of mankind" was unknown until the 17th century and then became "universally 
accepted as dogma in the nineteenth" (p. 25). However, the meaning of progress changed 
significantly: where once it was limited to the accumulation of knowledge ending with 
"man's coming of age," today it knows no bounds (Arendt, 1970, p. 25). It is the doctrine 
that now must validate itself by its nonexistent future claims. Looking back to 
revolutionary eschatology, the world is dominated by evil, which the Saints of God will 
eventually overthrow and have dominion over the earth, culminating in the end of 
history. In secular modernity, with no hope for divine intervention, earthly paradise will 
always be perpetually just over the horizon, and man is forever burdened with the task of 
Sisyphus. 
 It is interesting to note that the epistemologies of science and religion as defined 
in opposition to one another hardened in the 19th century, the age which Arendt (1970) 
argues also hardened the myth of unlimited progress. Conceptual distinctions between 
religion and science were far less absolute than they are today. As a product of mid-19th 
century social philosophy, the terms science and religion overlapped just as often as they 
diverged. In his essay, The late Victorian conflict of science and religion as an event in 
nineteenth-century intellectual and cultural history, Frank M. Turner (2010) maps out 
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this transformation. He examines the historiography of science and religion and their 
changing meanings throughout history and concludes that  
between 1750 and 1870 . . . the relationship of science and religion in the western 
world passed from fruitful co-operation and modest tensions to harsh public 
conflict, a situation that many observers have since come incorrectly to assume to 
be a permanent fact of modern cultural life. (p. 87)  
His approach rejects the assumption that the modern associative meanings of science and 
religion were historically "a necessary or existential conflict" (p. 88). The socially-
corrosive Other in Christian thought was rarely science before around 1860; the dangers 
were more often “materialism or atheism (neither ever well-defined), skeptical 
rationalism, theological heterodoxy, ecclesiastical irregularity, or outright attacks by the 
secular state” (Turner, 2010, p. 89). In the early 19th century, religious as well as social 
philosophy were deeply influenced by the French Revolution and its secular principles. 
British men of science worked within an ideological climate whereby one was 
encouraged to pursue scientific inquiry within the context of theism (Turner, 2010, p. 90). 
However, as theology began to define itself against the new positivism of scientific 
inquiry, the struggle for perfection in secular thought unknowingly retained the 
eschatological concerns of its predivergent epistemological ancestry.  
 My intention is not to argue that 21st century Western civilization is better or 
worse than others, nor to encourage total relativism. I am interested in how ideology 
functions as a pathology accepted as matter of fact, and how this pathology serves to 
undermine critical inquiry. There are unintended moral effects when we conflate material 
and moral advancement. Rationality, under the umbrella of positivism, seeks to divide 
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fact from value and cast aside moral judgments as beyond the realm of meaning and 
therefore unscientific. This is not intrinsically sinister until it becomes totalizing. When 
we construct modern secular education as structurally scientific, by assessing students 
objectively, treating teachers as technological transmitters of discrete information called 
knowledge, and destroying the public realm by viewing everyone as human capital and 
human resources, morality forcefully reveals itself. This construction of education is 
bizarre as to render most speechless if they ever give it a moment's thought (hopefully). 
As I write this on the eve of the centenary of the First World War, jihadist militants have 
just seized chemical weapons hoarded by Saddam Hussein's defunct regime, and mustard 
gas may be used to murder innocent civilians once again (McElroy, 2014). History 
repeats itself. We obviously cannot rely solely on science, technology, and economics for 
moral guidance as they are fundamentally amoral. Yet, why do we leave it to these 
disciplines to tell us the aims of our educational institutions? Because they are the tenets 
of modernity, a progress theology we hold so dear to us they remain unquestioned for 
fear that in doing so we will lose our identity as civilized moderns.  
 Let us discuss some moral consequences to critically abiding by this progress 
theology. Throughout modernity, many thinkers have questioned our conviction that we 
are truly rational beings. For Terry Eagleton (2010), a "mindless progressivism poses a 
greater threat to political changes than an awareness of the nightmare of history" (p. 155). 
He argues that in the modern age the psyche of psychoanalysis has replaced the soul of 
theology--yet without the comfort of God, "psychoanalysis must remain tragically 
unappeased . . . as the science of human discontent" (Eagleton, 2010, p. 17). He discusses 
Freud's “death drive,” the nihilistic unreason lurking underneath our illusions of 
38 
 
 
ourselves as rational beings, the "deliriously orgiastic revolt against interest, value, 
meaning, and rationality . . . [the] insane urge to shatter the lot of them in the name of 
nothing whatsoever" (p. 109). When applied to classical economic theory, which requires 
that humans behave rationally, Freud's hypothesis proves much less scandalous than one 
would initially think. In his work Consuming Schools: Commercialism and the End of 
Politics, Trevor Norris (2011) outlines the many interpretations of consumerist behaviour 
which subvert man's belief in his own capacity to act with reason. When discussing 
Marx's analysis of the "fetishistic character of commodities," Norris says, "The word 
fetish not only contrasts the rationality and instrumentalism prevalent in labour and 
production, but also suggests the residue of religion still present in commodity relations, 
in the belief that inanimate things have human characteristics" (p. 22). Norris also cites 
the work of anthropologist Theodor Veblen, whose term “conspicuous consumption” 
reflects the premodern desires of consumers to ritualize status even to the detriment of 
their own self-preservation (p. 28). Therefore, Norris (2011) argues that "capitalism is not 
necessarily driven by a pervasive rationalization of all aspects of human life and social 
existence, but often irrationality and desire" (p. 25). To stop spending, to delay 
gratification, is discouraged in consumer culture; to drive up personal debt to the 
detriment of future security (and the next generation's) is a nihilistic tendency we see too 
often in capitalist modernity. Global financial crises are certainly not a part of our 
conception of progress (Norris, 2011, p. 9). 
 Ronald Wright (2004) discusses what he calls “progress traps,” one of which is 
another example of the moral consequences of progress theology: environmental 
degradation, the unwanted externality of the capitalist model of growth. In The End of 
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History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama (1992) extols the virtues of post-Cold War 
liberal democracy and deems it the perfection of government. Yet, by comparing this 
system with failed communism, he implies that capitalism is structurally necessary to 
achieve “the end of history.” Wright reminds us that "[o]ur age was bankrolled by the 
seizing of half a planet, extended by taking over most of the remaining half, and has been 
sustained by spending down new forms of natural capital, especially fossil fuels" (p. 
117). It is a progress that is unsustainable in every sense one could imagine, even though 
we recognize its expiry date. In his historical investigation of past societies, Jared 
Diamond (2005) cites “rational behaviour” as a compelling reason why societies self-
destruct even when the conditions for its potential ruin are clearly understood: 
some people may reason correctly that they can advance their own interests by 
behavior harmful to other people. Scientists term such behavior 'rational' precisely 
because it employs correct reasoning, even though it may be morally 
reprehensible . . . The  perpetrators feel safe because they are typically 
concentrated (few in number) and highly motivated by the prospect of reaping 
big, certain, and immediate profits, while the losses  are spread over large 
numbers of individuals. That gives the losers little motivation to go to the hassle 
of fighting back, because each loser loses only a little and would receive only 
small, uncertain, distant profits even from successfully undoing the minority's 
grab. (p. 427) 
He cites many examples of ineffective government regulation of natural resources to 
illustrate how these resources not only destroy the fate of the majority, but even the 
prosperity of the powerful elites who stand to most benefit from such exploitation. Kings, 
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chiefs, lords, and CEOs through the ages have lent credence to the notion of a repressed 
death drive to eat oneself. 
 Another example of the moral consequences of progress theology can be found in 
the history of imperialism, colonialism, and genocide. For Wright (2004), "the moral 
values attached to civilization are specious: too often used to justify attacking and 
dominating the other, less powerful, societies" (p. 33). Since the Enlightenment, the 
colonizing missions of the European West have often murdered millions by racist policies 
aimed at civilizing. Arendt (1973) traces the origins of totalitarianism, manifested in 
Nazism and Communism, to imperialist projects at the turn of the 20th century. When 
discussing the Boers in South Africa, she argues that colonizers viewed the native 
peoples as abstractions of primordial man, which thereby justified treating these peoples 
as savages, subhuman animals. Similar to the way we can denigrate the natural landscape 
to maintain progress, we tend to denigrate those inhabitants of the natural landscape who 
have not yet controlled nature, and separate ourselves as artifices proven worthy of being 
civilized: 
What made [the native peoples] different from other human beings was nature, 
that they treated nature as their undisputed master, that they had remained, in all 
its majesty, the only overwhelming reality -- compared to which they appeared to 
be phantoms, unreal and ghostlike. They were, as it were, 'natural' human beings 
who lacked the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, so 
that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they 
had committed murder. (Arendt, 1973, p. 192)  
Therefore, what is natural in progress theology is, in fact, the artifice of civilization, 
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which reaffirms the myth of mastery over nature. Time and again progress is shown to be 
a project only for the select few of the enlightened West. 
 Yet, we often become what we repress. In the novel Blood Meridian, Cormac 
McCarthy (1992) examines the savage nature of civilized man. Taking place in the 
aftermath of the Mexican-American war of the 1840s, its story of a group of paid 
scalphunters is a chilling indictment of progress for its own sake, its artistic achievement 
unmatched by any other work of fiction since its publication in 1985. John Ralston Saul 
(1995) contends that the opening of the American West was one of those rare historical 
exceptions where people lived outside of society as we know it (p. 73). The wilderness in 
Blood Meridian is a negative space, a space of loss, without the human presence of 
civilization, but apparently without anything of meaning or purpose. Since the 
publication of his famous essay The Significance of the Frontier in American History in 
1893, Frederick Jackson Turner's (1920) examination into the effect of the closing of the 
American frontier had an enormous influence on popular thinking towards the frontier 
perception in the collective consciousness. He argued that the origins of the democratic 
and egalitarian spirit of the American character can be traced to the frontier experience 
through westward expansion. David and Jeanne Heidler's (2003) research on 
contemporary accounts of American attitudes towards expansionism and exceptionalism 
reveals that the public perception of the frontier borderlands has not changed significantly 
since colonial times. They argue that "mastering a wilderness bred a peculiar American 
spirit that would make revolution rather than bow to external power" (p. 14). Therefore, 
deep within the American psyche is a progress theology of mastery--but more insidiously 
a death drive turned outward, a Nietzschean will to power run amok justified by utopian 
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thinking. This desire to destroy emphasizes the regressive, primitive characteristic of the 
frontier spirit. In McCarthy's (1992) novel, the character of the judge is the ghoulish 
manifestation of the Enlightenment's logical conclusion to replace man as the godhead, 
while paradoxically absolving the individual of his moral responsibility in the divine 
quest for progress. He tells his tribe of American scalphunters, "every man is tabernacled 
in every other and he in exchange and so on in an endless complexity of being and 
witness to the uttermost edge of the world" (p. 147). He says, "war is the truest form of 
divination" (p. 261). In order to be your own War God, you must not live in mystery and 
fear because man can dominate nature and choose whether or not to destroy it. In this 
way, he can "dictate the terms of his own fate" (McCarthy, 1992, p. 208). The judge 
argues, "If war is not holy man is nothing but antic clay" (McCarthy, 1992, p. 319). By 
elevating violence by using religious rhetoric, he sees himself as the usurper of God, as if 
he is a war deity himself, and blood his communal sacrifice. He says, "Whatever in 
creation exists without my knowledge exists without my consent" (McCarthy, 1992, p. 
207). He is the God of nihilism, of genocide without rational explanation, the virtue of 
blood for blood's sake. Attempting to rationalize murder is futile because, as the judge 
lectures, "It makes no difference what men think of war . . . War endures. As well ask 
men what they think of stone. War was always here. Before man was, war waited for him 
(McCarthy, 1992, p. 259). 
 The final aspect of progress theology, then, is its own nihilistic tendencies. With 
the disintegration of the public realm, man's capacity to act and make change is futile 
against the ideological currents of historical inevitability. Utopian futurism leads to a 
void of the present. When the bios politikos is subsumed under systems of organization, 
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such as economics, which render the individual a passive subject of narcissistic self-
interest, it leaves a void. As John Ralston Saul (1995) argues,  
Government is the only organized mechanism that makes possible that level of 
shared  disinterest known as the public good. Without this greater interest the 
individual is reduced to a lesser, narrower being limited to immediate needs. He 
will then be subject to other, larger forces, which will necessarily come forward to 
fill the void left by the withering of the public good. (p. 72)  
Without the bios politikos, we are given the illusion of only two choices, a Manichean 
prompt either to accept the utopian progress of modernity or revert to the primitivism of 
premodernity. Progress means process, and "if everything is understood as being part of a 
process, and deriving its significance from the process, nothing has meaning in itself" 
(Canovan, 1974, p. 102). Reflecting on his novel Brave New World, Aldous Huxley 
(1950) lamented this Manichean flaw inherent in his story: "the Savage is offers only two 
alternatives, an insane life in Utopia, or the life of a primitive in an Indian village, a life 
more human in some respects, but in others hardly less queer and abnormal" (p. 7). If he 
were to revise it, he would offer the Savage a third alternative, to create a new world in 
which "[s]cience and technology would be used as though . . . they had been make for 
man, not (as at present and still more so in Brave New World) as though man were to be 
adapted and enslaved to them" (Huxley, 1950, p. 8). His view of history, like the ancient 
Greeks, is more cyclical, which he believes is key for the possibility for "natality" (in 
Arendt's , 1998, words, p. 247). Huxley says,  
for the immediate future is likely to resemble the immediate past, and in the 
immediate past rapid technological changes, taking place in a mass-producing 
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economy . . . have always tended to produce economic and social confusion. To 
deal with confusion, power has been centralized and government control 
increased. (p. 11)  
The ultimate political project of centralization and control has been totalitarianism, which 
Arendt (1973) argues is not an exaggerated form of past tyranny, but a deeply modern 
byproduct of modernist thinking to construct a singular, absolutist ideology that glorifies 
the inevitability of progress, represses individual agency, and encourages thoughtlessness 
and passivity all through the means of violence and terror. Those of us in the capitalist 
hegemony of the West should not be so smug, though, for Arendt (1973) argues that 
modernity is the common thread connecting totalitarianism and those political systems of 
liberal democracy. The axioms remain similar throughout. 
 The ouroboros, an ancient symbol depicting a serpent eating its own tail, is an apt 
illustration for modernity's fundamental contradictions. Appearing as early as the 
Enigmatic Book of the Netherworld, a funerary text found in the Tomb of Tutankhamun 
(Hornung, 1999, p. 78), the ouroboros has been commonly interpreted throughout the 
ages as symbolizing the circular, the eternal, the antithesis of our modernist conception of 
the linearity of time and progress. In a Socratic dialogue, Timaeus describes the Creator 
making the first creature a self-sufficient serpent, without any need for eyes, ears, or 
bodily organs, who ingests its own waste, because "all that he did or suffered [took] place 
in and by himself" (Plato, 2008). Jung (1977) interpreted the ouroboros as an archetype, 
reflecting the persistence of "the integration and assimilation of the opposite" (p. 365). 
The shadow self, revealed by the ouroboros, resides in the darkness of our psyche, which 
we deny by constructing a boundary between our reason and unreason, either symbolic or 
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physical, as manifested in the Iron Curtain. It is helpful to remind ourselves that the 
tyranny of linearity is only a construction of modernity, and this symbol offers us pause 
to reflect on the value of self-criticism. A commitment to a constant revision of concepts 
is the essence of modernity. Having refuted the claims of mysticism, modernity must 
keep reflecting back upon itself and criticize secularism. This is the true fundamental 
tenet of modernity, or else all other tenets become uncritical ideologies, mere contingents 
given the superiority of necessity. Taken another way, the ouroboros may be interpreted 
as ultimate futility, and we can be sympathetic to those contingent necessities we 
construct as certainties, for they can provide comfort against alienation and loneliness, 
those conditions central to modernity, as expressed in the Earth Speaks campaign. To 
quote Matthew Arnold (1998), 
 Ah, love, let us be true 
 To one another! for the world, which seems 
 To lie before us like a land of dreams, 
 So various, so beautiful, so new, 
 Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, 
 Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
 And we are here as on a darkling plain 
 Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
 Where ignorant armies clash by night. (p. 78) 
To keep vigilant against those "ignorant armies" is necessary to recognize those irrational 
aspects of our faith in rationality. As Terry Eagleton wrote in 1987 and which still applies 
today, "We are now in the process of awakening from the nightmare of modernity, with 
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its manipulative reason and fetish of the totality" (as cited in Grenz, 1996, p. 48). To 
recognize the primitive in the modern is a tragic paradox, but essential to uphold the 
principle of total critical inquiry or we risk falling victim to the dogmatic tyranny of 
progress and thereby undermining the very nature of the modernist project. Our analysis 
of interstellar transmissions from the opening of this chapter reveals this. Contact with 
sentient beings may force us to come to terms with the primitive aspects of our modern 
condition. From Stanley Kubrick, 
If you try to remove yourself from an Earthly perspective and look at this tragic 
paradox with the detachment of an extraterrestrial, the whole thing is totally 
irrational. Man now has the power in one mad, incandescent moment to 
exterminate the entire species . . . to  an observer in the Andromeda nebulae, the 
sign of our extinction would be no more than a match flaring for a second in the 
heavens; and if that match does blaze in the darkness, there will be none to mourn 
a race that used a power that could have lit a beacon in the  stars to light its 
funeral pyre. (as cited in Agel, 1970, pp. 353-354) 
Manifestos for Education 
 Where modernity and education intersect is in praxis. Education is the practical, 
concrete manifestation of the tenets (and by proxy the dangers) of modernist thought. 
Turn on any news channel and one can view the societal ills of rising wealth inequality, 
continuing economic crises, and the encroachment of corporatism in democracy, and the 
solution to these problems continually falls upon education as a philosopher's stone. It is 
an idealism bordering on the pathological, for what is education today but a reflection of 
the conditions of its external environment? It has never been a Garden of Eden, protected 
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by its thick walls from the intrusions of society. It reflects society. Its purpose is defined 
and dictated by society's needs: to increase human capital for the national economy, or to 
teach democratic values, for instance. Today education has no freedoms; it is the servant 
of the society beyond its borders, and, therefore, it is society. It cannot produce solutions 
to society's problems because the means of its production contain the seeds of its own 
destruction. Is it the failure of education itself to live up to its goals? Or is there 
something structurally flawed with the pretheoretical conditions of modernity by which 
so often the aims of education are based upon? 
 Here is an example: it is a strong tenet of modernity that our contemporary 
systems of human organization, such as capitalism, adhere to ideals such as democracy, 
individualism, and meritocracy. But unfettered capitalism, according to many social 
theorists and economists, such as Chris Hedges (2009b) and Thomas Piketty (2014), 
inevitably leads to an aristocracy, or in modern-speak, “a corporate oligarchy” who uses 
wealth to influence the political sphere to then undermine democracy, individualism, and 
meritocracy. This is achieved through the idealization of corporatism which trumps the 
individual's best interests. According to John Ralston Saul (1995), "We are rewarded in 
our hierarchical meritocracies for our success as an integrated function" (p. 31). 
Marketplace ideology is only a specter to shroud the realities of structural social 
inequality, and the idea that we can reduce these inequalities through skills training and 
increasing human capital is putting the cart before the horse. In a true democracy, 
legitimacy must lie with the citizen, not the marketplace. Economics, as it was 
historically intended, must be the slave to politics. However, if the aims of education are 
simply to administer the existing corporatist system, then education is failing in its 
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primary role to teach thought, not merely the passive, mechanistic management of 
knowledge in the service of the economy. 
 Why do we subscribe to these aims of education while simultaneously deriding 
and lamenting the effects they produce? To answer this, Gert Biesta and Carl Anders 
Säfström's (2011) A manifesto for education provides a new conceptual framework for 
perceiving how modernity's tenets are appropriated in education. They ask: What makes 
education educational? This is difficult to definitively answer since education is currently 
unfree as a serf to other disciplines such as economics and sociology, but without asking 
this fundamental aim of education we run the risk of "eradicating the very thing that 
might matter educationally" (Biesta & Säfström, 2011, p. 543). They argue that its aims 
tend to be defined as either populist or idealist--which both contribute to unfreedom in 
different ways. Populism views education as a problem to be solved by means that are 
objective, measurable, analytic, positivist, based on "ordering," "instrumental choice," 
and "scientific evidence" (Biesta & Säfström, 2011, p. 540). Populism expects too little, 
for its primary purpose is to adapt to society and thereby collapse any distinction between 
education and society: "Education . . . both as an idea and in the form of a particular 
school-system, does not lie outside the construction of the modern welfare state, but its 
very foundation" (Biesta & Säfström, 2011, p. 544). While populism wants education to 
simply conform, idealism expects too much. It makes education unfree by its 
"overbearing expectations" to instruct students on abstract concepts such as "democracy, 
solidarity, inclusion, tolerance, social justice and peace" (Biesta & Säfström, 2011, p. 
540). They criticize the Enlightenment's tendency to view education in the service of a 
process of liberation, and as previously discussed, our contemporary myths of the utopian 
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futurism of progress push the attainment of liberation as perpetually out of reach. By 
equating education as progress, education loses any substance because, like populism, it 
remains unfree as purely instrumental. I am reminded here of Horkheimer and Adorno 
(2002), and Marcuse's (1966) criticisms of reified subject matter, in which abstracted 
categories of society inculcate in the student an impotence and unfreedom to make 
change by their own individual agency. For instance, Biesta and Säfström are critical of 
"self-affirmation" (p. 541), since this presupposes an abstraction of Self, which Marcuse 
argues is a totalizing concept that encourages unfreedom (p. 209).  
 Therefore, Biesta and Säfström (2011) argue that freedom must lie at the heart of 
education, and not a negative freedom with the absence of any authority but rather a 
"relational" freedom, an "authority that carries an orientation towards freedom with it" (p. 
540). They posit that an effective conceptual framework for including freedom in 
education is atemporal thinking. They ask, "Could it be, therefore, that we need to take 
temporality out of education in order to capture something educationally?" (p. 543). To 
stay in the tension between what is (education as adaptation to existing conditions) and 
what is not (education as deferred utopianism to nonexistent conditions) is to allow the 
space for "an 'excess' that announces something new and unforseen" (Biesta & Säfström, 
2011, p. 541). One may interpret populism as utopian, though, thereby collapsing the 
binary. Enlightenment idealism has become a corporeal utopianism. Progress has 
hardened into a secular myth, such as the belief that increasing human capital will 
alleviate the existing social inequalities in the national economy. Plato's (2007) utopian 
treatise The Republic reminds us of the tendency to apply idealism to political 
authoritarianism. Progress, rationality, futurism, and instrumentality may all be viewed as 
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characteristics shared by populism and idealism. This makes the manifesto even more 
alarming. Rather than being attacked by two sides, education is attacked by the totalizing 
domination of modernity's assumed tenets, and as discussed, the conflation of scientific, 
technological, and economic progress with the acquisition of moral precepts implies that 
issues of morality need never be brought up in modern education. What is central to the 
tenets of modernity are conceptions of time, history, and progress. Therefore, I take up 
Biesta and Säfström's challenge to think atemporally because it will provide the most 
effective means to subvert the progress theology of modernity, which lurks underneath 
the aims of education. Fictions shroud us from seeing education as it is actually 
manifested structurally. To think atemporally does not mean to think ahistorically, for 
temporal thinking can lend itself to an ahistorical mindset. If we take lessons from the 
nonexistent future, and if progress is inevitable, then why study the past? Rather, 
atemporal thinking means to refuse to take for granted that social conditions improve 
over time, or that what is accepted today is based on the accumulation and recorrection of 
past knowledge, and, therefore, the best means by which to educate. Atemporal thinking 
will help us to demarcate the “what it claims” from “the what is actually.”  
 As a practical application of this approach, I will focus on the Ontario community 
college system in the following chapter. Founded in 1965, this system was born out of the 
culture of the 1960s, infused with the historical conditions of the Cold War and 
competing conceptions of progress. It is deeply associated with the development of the 
postwar welfare state. As Biesta and Säfström (2011) outline when discussing Sweden's 
postwar climate,   
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Technology was to become the driving force while education was to prepare the 
ground for such a new society. . . The values and norms through which this brave 
new world would form itself were based on the power of technology to make 
human living smoother and more effective in achieving its aspirations . . . The 
rationale behind this was the need to both construct and control the emergence of 
a new type of citizen, the modern democratic 'man'. (p. 544) 
Today, there has been a "discursive shift . . . characterized by a return to 'positivistic' 
knowledge produced by brain research, evidence-based research, positivistic psychology, 
and leadership and efficiency ideas in all matters concerning schooling" (Biesta and 
Säfström, 2011, p. 545). This societal change is central to understand why myths of 
modernity remain in the Ontario community college system. The aims of education in its 
rhetoric are archaic and, therefore, fictitious. Times have changed. Since the immediate 
postwar period, neoliberal policies have proceeded to slowly dismantle the welfare state 
through its ideologies of self-interest. For instance, Steve Fuller (2007) has outlined the 
transition from policies of public good to policies of social capital. In the 1950s, 
economist Paul Samuelson argued that certain public goods, including education, must be 
provided by the state because they will never be effectively provided for by an 
unregulated free market (as cited in Fuller, 2007, p. 167). Conversely, the rise of social 
capital in the 1970s was based on concepts of competitive advantage, "a good whose 
value is principally tied to the exclusion of specific customers: the exact opposite of a 
public good" (Fuller, 2007, p. 169). While vocational training has always remained 
fundamental to the Ontario community college system from its inception, the means by 
which education should provide this service has altered. One need only to look at the 
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exponential rise of tuition over the past few decades. Even accounting for inflation, it was 
much cheaper to attend higher education in the 1960s. Recent policy documents (e.g., the 
Rae Report from 2005) avoid the controversial subject of tuition freezing, since this 
method of government intervention is at odds with the doctrine of neoliberalism. Not 
only have attitudes towards education changed; the world has changed. Globalization, the 
dismantling of the nation-state, economic stasis: these developments have not only 
rendered the original aims of the Ontario community college system anachronistic, but 
even the principles of social capital. The implementation of neoliberal policies has even 
failed to live up to expectations, mainly because these policies adhere, paradoxically, to 
archaic conceptions of scientific, technological, and economic progress. The ouroboros 
keeps making its appearance. 
 A central claim in this thesis is that there has been a societal paradigm shift which 
does not appropriately reflect the curricula, assessment, and aims of the Ontario 
community college system. We are still burdened by progress theology, which may have 
been easier to defend in 1965, but today we increasingly find devoid of any meaning or 
substance. So many historical changes have occurred since the inception of the Ontario 
system: the diminution of postwar prosperity, which Thomas Piketty (2014) argues was 
merely an exception to the broader historical trend of capitalist growth; the rise of the 
New Right, Reagan, Thatcher, and laissez-faire economics; mainstream neoliberalism 
and the further encroachment of scientism and economics in other disciplines; and 
paradoxically the increasing popularity of postmodernism in both academica and culture, 
which is soundly disregarded by the college system other than paying it lip service by 
appropriating empty rhetoric such as diversity and globalization. 
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 An analysis of the ur-text of Ontario community college policy reveals the 
archaism of its aims, which are still adopted wholeheartedly 49 years later. On 21 May 
1965, Bill Davis, then Minister of Education and later Premier of Ontario, gave a speech 
to the legislature introducing a bill to establish the Ontario community college system. 
Davis constantly adopts the language of time and progress. Of course, this reveals 
nothing of its deep content, but it gives us an idea what is floating around in his mind. It 
is important to note all instances, listed sequentially, in order to emphasize my point: 
"major step forward … development … new … development … change and invention …    
continued growth and expansion … ever-changing … rapidly … advancing … of our 
times … development … future … speed of technological change … goals … present-
day world" (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, p. 5), "expansion … technological 
change … economic growth … future growth … increased productivity and efficiency … 
goal … future … change" (p. 6), "change … improvement … change … rate of 
production of knowledge and technological applications … changes … future … 
advanced states of industrialism … to attain these goals … more efficient … future … 
development … social and technological change … fruitful changes … economic and 
social demands not only of today but of tomorrow … expansion" (p. 7), "fulfillment … 
expand … changing demands of challenging times … expansion … inevitability … 
updating" (p. 8), "highly industrialized province … a preview of things to come … very 
near future … growth" (p. 9), "developed … extend … future … anticipate … future" (p. 
10), "growth patterns," "press forward,” "beginning," and "development and expansion" 
(p. 11), "very near future … developed", (p. 12), "advanced" (p. 13), "expansion … 
future … change … development … press forward as rapidly as possible … immediate 
54 
 
 
future … headlong pace of technological change" (p. 14), "foreseeable future … 
expanded … developed" (p. 15), "expansion … future … optimistic … developments … 
rapidly … rapidly expanding … technical advancement" (p. 16). Compare this to 
possibly only three instances which explicitly make mention of the past, such as the 
comment, "Fruitful changes must be made throughout our school system, without, of 
course, destroying those valuable and still useful parts of the structure developed over 
many years" (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, p. 7). Obviously, this speech is 
introducing a new education system; therefore, language relating to the future is to be 
expected. However, the frequency by which Davis appeals to concepts of progress is 
staggering, and with so much insistence on uncritical progress it is harmful not to 
interrogate one's own presuppositions of the nature of linear time and historical change.  
 One such harm is the insistence that progress is inevitable, an insidious claim that 
positions the government as passive recipients of broader, largely economic, forces at 
work. Davis asserts that vocational training is "essential to the continued growth and 
expansion of the economy" (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, p. 5). There is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with vocational training, but Davis cites the inevitably of 
technological change as the precipitator of this new venture. He warns, "We have no 
choice but to press forward as rapidly as possible with the establishment of such colleges 
. . . The headlong pace of technological change gives no chance of a pause in the 
development" (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, p. 14). Quoting Premier John 
Robarts, Davis notes this change is accelerating and adopts positivist rhetoric when he 
says, "The evidence is surely clear and irrefutable: social and technological changes . . . 
are not only inevitable but in the long-run beneficial" (Ontario Department of Education, 
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1967, p. 6). This "man-dominated phenomenon" of change inversely reduces the 
individual passive against the sweeping forces of modernity: "[t]he whole history of 
mankind has been a story of change and adaptation; without change, obviously, there can 
be no improvement" (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, pp. 6-7). Regardless, 
training students as 'knowledge workers' is necessary as "the prime economic need for 
societies in advanced states of industrialism" (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, p. 
7).  
 It is worth noting three social conditions mentioned in this speech that are now 
becoming historically obsolete. One, the belief in continued economic expansion. 
Economist Thomas Piketty (2014) cites in-depth empirical evidence to support the claim 
that the era of postwar prosperity was the exception, rather than the rule, of modern 
capitalism, and we are entering an age of very slow economic growth. In fact, John 
Ralston Saul wrote in 1995 that real growth disappeared in the mid-1970s due to "a stock 
market which . . . moves in a manner unrelated to investment in real production, 
declining wages for the vast majority of the population, [and] chronic unemployment" (p. 
118). When economic expansion transitions to near stasis, the project of guaranteeing job 
prosperity becomes increasingly untenable. While vocational training may be more vital 
in this climate, it is disingenuous to sell yourself as a guarantor of employment. Look at 
any advertisement for community college and you will immediately see this disingenuous 
rhetoric. This leads me to my second point: the changing nature of technological 
innovation. A utopian fantasy of technological automation reveals itself when Davis says 
that future graduates will be in demand to "supervise or work in our new automated 
factories and offices" (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, p. 9). Due to the 
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sweeping forces of globalization and the transition of North American society from a 
manufacturing to a service-based economy, technology as machines for production is 
becoming an obsolete term as it is increasingly becoming associated with the means to 
engage in global finance and administration. As Chris Hedges (2011b) argues, 
corporations don't produce anything . . . they are speculators . . . they don't 
manufacture, they don't make anything, they gamble, they use money, and they 
believe falsely that money is real, as we dismantle our manufacturing base and 
send jobs over the border to Mexico and finally into the embrace of China.  
Davis is cognizant to learn from the mistakes of the United States community college 
system and establish a uniquely Canadian institution, but is yet to realize that to "continue 
to compete for markets on even terms at home and abroad" (Ontario Department of 
Education, 1967, p. 9) will erode the autonomy of the nation-state and its right to self-
determine its educational policies. My third point is the supposition of population 
expansion, which Davis calls one of "the simple facts of life with which we must live 
today" (Ontario Department of Education, 1967, p. 9). Global demographic trends may 
be close to flatlining, as research by Thomas Piketty (2014) illustrates. Ontario 
community college enrollment is up mainly due to the ever-increasing numbers of 
international student admissions (Colleges Ontario, 2011, p. 2), which re-emphasizes the 
system's need to establish itself as a global, rather than national, institution. It is yet 
another example that you cannot take expansion as a given; changing historical 
conditions should make us question our assumptions of progress. 
 Due to this analysis, one may be lead to charge Mr. Davis as an ideologue and 
technocrat who has blind faith in the progress theologies of scientific, technological, and 
57 
 
 
economic advancement. However, the Hall-Dennis Report of 1968 (Ontario Department 
of Education, 1968), which he commissioned, offered a very progressive vision for 
education in Ontario's secondary schools based on true democracy and citizenship; 
therefore, I will reserve ad hominum judgment. As I argue throughout this thesis though, 
there are moral repercussions when "the citizen is reduced to the status of a subject at the 
foot of the throne of the marketplace" (Saul, 1995, p. 76), even within the realm of 
postsecondary learning. Davis not only believes that vocational training will result in 
monetary attainment, but also "human happiness and satisfaction" (Ontario Department 
of Education, 1967, p. 16). This may be not only scandalous, but deeply immoral. 
 The next chapter will investigate the theoretical presuppositions underlying 
assessment criteria in English courses taught at Ontario community colleges. As an 
instructor at the front lines, I recognize that the difference between what English is and 
what it could be finds its genesis in my experiences teaching at one of these institutions, 
because English as a discipline remains a potential political theatre of war in which 
students may be led to subversively question the axioms of the aims of their institution's 
educational aspirations. To quote Hannah Arendt (1964), "writing is an integral part of 
the process of understanding." English holds a unique place in community colleges. It is 
the last bastion of a mandatory humanities-oriented requirement within a system that 
increasingly sees no value in its pedagogical approach. To meet governmental and 
economic needs to teach skills in reading and writing, students must demonstrate 
proficiency in these abilities as part of vocational learning. However, like a corpse 
drained of its blood and replaced with embalming fluids, English must become purged of 
its subversive potential. Critical inquiry becomes an empty buzzword in favour of 
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depoliticized and purportedly value neutral communication skills. It becomes, in the 
words of T. Norris (February 27, 2014), "communication without communication" 
(personal communication). 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE POLITICS OF CLARITY 
"If you live today, you breathe in nihilism. In or out of the Church, it's the gas you 
breathe" (Flannery O'Connor, 1988, p. 97). 
The Morality of Amorality 
 It seems as if we are living in a perpetual crisis in education. Academics, 
journalists, and policy-analysts in the public realm have either contributed to this shared 
anxiety or noted the historiographical nature of such pronouncements (Arendt, 2006a; 
Bartlett & LeRose, 2013; Biesta & Säfström, 2011, p. 540; Fish, 2010; Mulholland, 2010; 
Nussbaum, 2010, p. 1; Sadovnik, Cookson, & Semel, 2013, p. 1; Sprenger, 2010). Today 
this discourse is largely framed within a postfinancial crisis mindset. As the promise of 
increased job security and social capital in a postsecondary diploma slips further away, as 
debt and unemployment become the common fate of recent graduates, as the Senior 
Economist for the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives warns youth of the "scorched 
earth policies" championed by the older generations who wish to resist tuition subsidies 
(Bartlett & LeRose, 2013), the sense of collective anxiety among students and teachers 
alike and the pressures to ensure vocationally-relevant skills are becoming more and 
more palpable. Students are afraid, and nowhere is this fear of irrelevant learning (any 
approach which does not explicitly develop one's human capital) more heightened than in 
the teaching of language proficiency in college education. The Canadian government, 
through the Employment and Social Development division, has identified reading and 
writing abilities as "validated key essential skills for the workplace" (Government of 
Canada, 2014). The Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities decrees that 
all graduates of provincial community colleges must demonstrate "Essential 
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Employability Skills", the very first being: "to communicate clearly, concisely and 
correctly in the written, spoken, and visual form that fulfills the purpose and meets the 
needs of the audience" (Government of Ontario, 2014). As subsidized by this 
government, colleges are then required to develop language proficiency in their students. 
According to Centennial College, these skills are "of critical importance to employers at 
the hiring stage, and to the potential for advancing in a chosen field and career" 
(Centennial College, 2014b).  
 The rhetoric of increasing human capital and a functionalist assumption of an 
educational system to service the needs of the greater economy are at work here. This is 
an admittedly important task, and I have no intrinsic criticisms of vocational education in 
principle. However, in this climate of perpetual fear, anxiety, and crisis, it is important to 
examine the theoretical presuppositions underlying such beliefs, and whether the blind 
application of these presuppositions might be having dire and unwanted consequences for 
those working within the structures of such systems. This is a pertinent question to ask, 
especially at a time when we might feel compelled to avoid asking this for trepidation of 
being irrelevant and unhelpful to the greater project of increasing human capital. In the 
collective nervousness to have education serve the needs of the broader economy, we are 
putting faith in the educational structures that assess such skills, I am most concerned 
with the moral repercussions of assessing these skills in the development of English 
language competency. It may seem strange to examine issues of morality in vocational 
education, since the rhetoric desperately avoids value-judgments entirely when discussing 
assessment. However, the uncontested axioms of vocational education, such as the 
application of scientism in all disciplines, is in itself a matter of faith. To demand 
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communication "clearly, concisely and correctly" is a reductionist statement that seeks to 
divide and keep separate the fact/value distinction of scientific positivism. I will argue 
that this is a form of what I will term secular theocracy due to the uncritical adherence of 
scientific, technological, and economic structures of human organization. A secular 
theocracy is a pedagogical imposition deemed immune to criticism and justified by its 
adherence to a tenet of modernity outlined previously. Like a theology, it is deeply moral, 
yet presented as secular, it is inversely presented as amoral and value neutral. In this 
chapter, I will examine the uncontested supremacy of scientific communication. We put 
faith in these scientific structures of human organization not for moral guidance, but 
instead because we mistakenly believe that they provide a neutral framework for our 
systems, merely an architecture for effective and efficient teaching and learning practices, 
and, thus, we do not require morality because the aims of education are already supplied: 
to increase human capital. A modern bureaucracy seeks to convince us that it is 
inherently rational, and, therefore, devoid of value-judgments such as moral statements. 
However, not only is an amoral stance a moral stance, but more dangerously a 
bureaucratic model of education that adopts scientific and technological principles of 
regulation (the same principles adopted by neo-classical economic theory) is a morally 
suspect ideology that attempts to convince us that it is fundamentally amoral.  
 I wish to examine the ways in which blind faith in these doctrines, this secular 
theocracy, has immoral repercussions. For example, the insistence of human capital 
attainment has a dark side; students who fail are deemed "human waste," according to the 
linguistic structures of neo-classical economic theory (Bauman, 2010, p. 4). To call a 
human being a kind of excrement is surely a moral pronouncement if there ever was one. 
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I will use the course outline and grading criteria of a specific course offered at Centennial 
College (2014a), COMM160: College Communications I, to demonstrate how discursive 
practices function to indoctrinate ideology, specifically the tenets of scientific positivism 
and neo-classical economic theory. I will present a historical, contextual perspective of 
this secular theocracy by relating the discursive practices to philosophical debates on 
archaic mid-20th century mindsets still adopted wholeheartedly in curriculum models 
today, and I will demonstrate that postmodern-oriented pedagogies, such as social 
construction theories, are merely paid lip service. I will frame my criticisms largely 
within the social theories presented by Hannah Arendt, Zygmunt Bauman, Sheldon 
Wolin, and Chris Hedges, particularly their accusations that bureaucratic, scientific, and 
economic systems of human organization serve to dehumanize the individual. We as 
individuals give up our capacity for action, in the words of Arendt (1998), when we allow 
terms such as clarity, objectivity, and human capital to mean more than the individual's 
desire to undermine the theoretical presuppositions that render him a powerless 
automaton. Decrees for clarity in writing are deeply political. In the midst of yet another 
crisis in education, our compulsion to make students employable may have resulted in a 
blind faith in a secular theocracy which purports to be completely amoral. I argue that 
morality has been there all along, albeit disguised, and that there are alarming moral 
effects when we choose belief without understanding. 
Positivist Faith and Quantified Assessment 
   In the grading criteria outlined in COMM160, there is an explicit insistence on 
the desirability of "clear" and "correct" writing (Centennial College, 2014a). Demands for 
"correct format and length," a "clear, effective topic sentence/thesis statement," to 
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connect ideas in a "clear, logical order," and to identify "clear main points of support" 
(Centennial College, 2014a) ensure that a student will meet the first of the Essential 
Employability Skills mentioned in the course outline, which is to "communicate clearly, 
concisely and correctly" (Centennial College, 2014a). To examine the moral implications 
of such a methodology, it is necessary to undermine the common-sense belief in these 
models of assessments. In order to do so, we must acknowledge that this scientific 
mindset of grading language skills is a historically recent and culturally-constructed 
paradigm. The presupposition that language can be clear is based on a reductionist 
approach to knowledge found in the epistemology of scientific positivism, which 
demarcates judgments based on fact and judgments based on value. In other words, facts, 
or authoritative knowledge, can only be accessed by mind-independent objects called 
sense-data. Therefore, moral pronouncements are nonempirical, value-based, 
unquantifiable, and beyond the scope of positivist epistemology. Educational researcher 
Kenneth R. Howe (2009) calls this approach to assessment "the new scientific 
orthodoxy" (p. 428), and traces its historical application in education. Based on the work 
of Auguste Comte, positivism arose in the early 20th-century as a philosophical 
movement. According to Trevor Norris (2014), it was soundly rejected by philosophers in 
the post-WWII period, but co-opted uncritically by disciplines in the social sciences, such 
as sociology and neo-classical economics. By making reference to Quine's (1970) 
seminal critique of positivism Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Howe demonstrates that 
reductionism's claim to demarcate analytic and synthetic statements is based on a false 
premise and, therefore, untenable. In short, the premise is that synthetic statements are 
verified by observable sense-data and analytic statements are verified by a priori logic. 
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Statements that cannot be positioned as either synthetic or analytic are deemed 
unscientific, unfactual, and value-based. However, philosophers such as Quine (1970) 
and Putnam (2002) have revealed that this fact/value distinction is false because 
supposedly analytical statements are circular. For instance, a teacher's assessment of a 
student's linguistic use of meaning, definition, and clarity is formed by an assumption that 
concepts such as meaning, definition, and clarity are analytical, but it is only a 
postulation that individual statements (e.g., this phrase has correct meaning and is 
therefore clear) can be tested in isolation. Instead, Quine asserts that "our statements 
about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as 
a corporate body" (p. 47). In other words, so-called analytic truths are, in fact, determined 
by other suppositions which are socially-constructed. Not only is the acquisition of 
language a social activity by which sounds (the signifiers) and conveyance (the signified) 
are assembled; words such as meaning, definition, and clarity are assembled in the same 
fashion, yet they are used as the means by which to make supposedly factual analytical 
statements about language. It is fitting that Howe labels these beliefs "positivist dogmas" 
(p. 428), since distinctly empirical and logical approaches to knowledge-acquisition may 
seem as sensical and universal as concepts of time and space.  
 In the realms of mathematical, scientific, and philosophical discourse, these 
criticisms of the fact/value distinction are highly esoteric and difficult to fully 
comprehend. For instance, Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem in mathematics, Werner 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics, and Quine (1970) and 
Putnam's (2002) essays all dispute reductionist claims but may be conceptually 
challenging for the uninitiated. This is perhaps why scientific positivism as an 
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epistemological method of assessment has been adopted so uncritically by educators. 
Euclidean and Newtonian conceptions of the world reign supreme. While theories of the 
social construction of language may be contested, such as Wittgenstein's (1953) language 
games, the most pertinent argument against the application of scientific rhetoric in the 
assessment of language competency is the absolute ineffectiveness of such grading 
criteria. For incoming international students, Centennial College uses a computer 
program called Accuplacer to assess a student's language skills. Accuplacer advertises 
itself by its ability to "accurately and efficiently assess" reading and writing skills 
(College Board, 2014). After assigning each test taker with a numerical score, students 
are then automatically placed in either COMM140/141, COMM160/161, or 
COMM170/171, courses in a progression of academic advancement. Yet within the first 
few weeks of each term, the English department is inundated with requests by teachers to 
move incoming students into other courses based on the teachers' own assessments of the 
students' writing abilities. I have suspicions that Accuplacer is merely a cost-saving 
device, but the belief of its inherent efficiency and objectivity is touted as doctrine by 
management. Faculty marking workshops can attest to the secular theocracy of this "new 
scientific orthodoxy" (Howe, 2009, p. 428). The grading criteria in COMM160 is highly 
quantified. For example, a student's demonstration of structure is scored as 30% of the 
total, with up to 5% awarded in six subcategories, such as meeting requirements to “stay 
on topic” and “connect ideas in a clear, logical order” (Centennial College, 2014a). We 
must make a distinction here between clarity as a value in language, and the ideological 
appropriation of the rhetoric of clarity. It is good to write clearly, but when its demand 
becomes heavily politicized, this is deeply problematic. All instructors in the department 
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must adhere to this rigid rubric, categorizing and docking specific marks for errors in 
structure, development, and sentence skills. However, language is an ever-evolving 
system; many grammatical rules, for instance, are constantly in flux, shifting in modes of 
acceptability. For example, many instructors argue over the correct placement of 
commas, and in faculty meetings this supposedly objective criteria for assessing a 
student's writing skills often reveals itself to be arbitrarily fluctuating when several 
instructors are given the same writing example to grade. Take the grammatical instance 
of a run on sentence, whereby two independent clauses are joined without a conjunction, 
perhaps separated by a comma. According to department policy, instructors must 
penalize a student 4% out of a total 100% on an assignment for each run on. Therefore, if 
students write four run ons in a final exam, their overall grade will be reduced by 16%. 
But professional writers often use run ons to rhetorical or literary effect. It is useful for 
remedial students to be advised of run ons, since a shorter sentence will help them to 
recognize the placement of their subjects and verbs, and thereby whether they have 
written a complete sentence. However, there is no faculty discussion on what context the 
run on is being used, which is integral to assessing the efficacy of communication. 
Language is never fixed, and there is a mistaken assumption that there is an objective 
body of knowledge that can be transmitted into the minds of students without the 
interference of individual cognitive misinterpretation. This approach may be apt when 
teaching Euclidean geometry, but as much as we may misappropriate grammar as the 
mechanics of language, the rules of grammar are constantly being amended by public 
consensus. More worryingly, faculty members in these meetings tend to admonish 
themselves rather than the methodology of assessment, as if they failed in their task to 
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implement the correct grading algorithm. The doctrine of a positivistic interpretation in 
meaning, definition, and objectivity takes precedence over a possible critical analysis of 
the theoretical presuppositions underlying epistemologies of scientific positivism.  
 In order to appreciate the moral repercussions of such a deluded and rigid 
insistence of this type of ineffective assessment, it is necessary to contextualize the 
changing conceptual definition of literacy in education. The rhetoric of building skills is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in public education. While the federal government 
conflates literacy and skills as the same concept (Government of Canada, 2014), 
vocational and liberal forms of education were quite distinct until well after the post-WII 
period. In her study of 18th-century Enlightenment attitudes towards education, Elisabeth 
Rose Gruner (2011) writes, "for Locke and even to some extent for Wollstonecraft, 
education [was] primarily a matter of manners and morals; curriculum [was] secondary" 
(p. 71).  Julie A. Reuben (2010) notes that immediately after WWII, moral education in 
the United States was a pressing issue in higher education, largely framed by a need to 
preserve democracy and foster democratic citizenship (p. 39). By the early 1970s, 
American universities responded to reductions in public aid, rising living costs, and the 
threat of economic recession by adopting corporate models (Reuben, 2010, p. 47). While 
it should be noted that some institutions have retained the Enlightenment model, in other 
institutions students became increasingly defined in economic terms as consumers, 
human resources, and human capital. Curricula became increasingly vocational to meet 
the needs of broader economic forces, and conversely enrolment in non-practical fields, 
such as English and History, began to dwindle. Yearly surveys conducted by the Higher 
Education Research institute at UCLA reveal the changing student attitudes towards the 
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aims of their degree. In the late 1960s, 80% of American freshmen selected "developing a 
meaningful philosophy of life" as "very important" or "essential," while only 45% 
selected "being well off financially" as "very important" or "essential." Since the late 
1980s, the percentage in these categories has been inverted (Reuben, 2010, p. 49). Noam 
Chomsky (2014) argues that Enlightenment thinkers would have vehemently opposed a 
model of education strictly based on skills transmission for the purposes of increasing 
human capital. He argues that the Enlightenment ideal of education, one that encourages 
the student to "acquire the capacity to inquire, to create, to innovate, to challenge" is the 
model we should be striving towards in 21st-century: 
You have to gain the capacity and the self-confidence to challenge and create and 
innovate, and that way you learn; that way you’ve internalized the material and 
you can go on. It’s not a matter of accumulating some fixed array of facts which 
then you can write down on a test and forget about tomorrow. (Chomsky, 2014)  
To investigate why a skills-based approach to literacy has become the dominant 
conception of education in the 21st century, we must ask the following questions: Which 
groups stand to benefit from such a model, and What is lost when students are 
discouraged to "challenge and create and innovate" (Chomsky, 2014)?  
 In order to answer the first question, Michael W. Apple (1990) contends that the 
best way to begin such an investigation is to "establish the connections between the 
dominant ideas of a society and the interests of particular classes and groups" (p. 155). 
Since the publication of Ideology and Curriculum, Apple has written to a great extent on 
identifying the power alliances in the United States that benefit from the hegemony of 
syllabus, including the selective tradition, legitimate or official knowledge 
69 
 
 
(re)production, and the hidden curriculum. At times, he has called these alliances the new 
right, the power bloc, or neoliberals and neoconservatives. Since the Reagan 
administration, Apple argues that a rightist agenda has dominated educational policy in 
the United States through the alliance of neoliberals (who wish to extend market-driven 
capitalist principles to educational models) and neoconservatives (who wish to return to 
the teaching of traditional knowledge, authority, standards, and national identity). This 
bloc has had increasing power in educational and social policy, especially in the 21st 
century. Apple's (1995) main concern with this bloc's influence is that it seeks to subvert 
the truly democratic and equitable approach to education, whereby those marginalized 
groups in society can learn in an environment that places them on an equal footing along 
with those within the dominant economic and cultural classes (p. 306).  
To apply Apple's (1990) theoretical framework to a contemporary issue, and to 
illustrate the delusion of ideological neutrality in educational practice, I will analyze the 
Race to the Top program, a recent initiative headed by the United States Department of 
Education (2013) and championed by President Barack Obama. In February 2009, 
Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which provided 
the basis for increased funding in educational reform. As a $4.3 billion contest for grants, 
Race to the Top is intended to incentivize teachers and schools to work towards 
increasing student achievement based on scientific positivism. In the words of the 
American government, its goal is to build "data systems that measure student growth and 
success" (United States Department of Education, 2013). One controversial aspect of this 
initiative is the adoption of rigorous assessment through the use of a standardized 
measurement of student achievement. The United States government rewards those 
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school districts that "have demonstrated success in raising student achievement" (United 
States Department of Education, 2013). Conversely, individual teachers and schools who 
fail to increase student examination scores suffer a decrease in funding or institutional 
closures. These decisions are based solely on quantitative analyses of those data systems 
which measure student academic performance. A close analysis of Obama's language 
when giving his first speech on the implementation of Race to the Top in 2009 reveals his 
ideological commitments. First, he assumes that education will benefit from the 
application of a capitalist free-market model. Like the power bloc, he firmly asserts that 
improving education is "essential in re-building [the] economy", and that it must take 
"business leaders to invest in their local schools" (Obama, 2009). He abhors the equal 
distribution of taxpayer's money, or even the targeting of those schools most in need of 
funding, insinuating that socialist-leaning education models will not improve the 
education system. In order to "incentivize excellence and spur reform," schools and 
districts must compete with one another rather than receiving "hand-outs" (Obama, 
2009). By its very nature, a race implies that some schools must fail in order for others to 
'win', thereby reinforcing stratified schooling. Rather than acknowledge that governments 
must enforce regulatory constraints on free-market capitalism to prevent corruption (as he 
has argued with regards to the financial system), he warns local union leaders that 
collective bargaining must be "a catalyst and not an impediment to reform" (Obama, 
2009). Apple (1990) warns us that those in power seek to push their ideological agenda in 
the guise of empiricist, politically neutral, positivist science. Obama ensures the audience 
that this agenda is "not based on politics or ideology or the preferences of a particular 
interest group" because it will be based on "data-driven results" (Obama, 2009). 
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However, this attitude towards educational reform reflects a neoliberal political 
perspective because neoliberals tend to blame ineffective schools and useless teachers as 
the principal causes of school and student failures. To an extent, neoliberals recognize 
that external social factors, such as poverty, class, and race, influence student success in 
the internal school system, so state intervention in educational policy is necessary to 
ensure students are treated equitably. However, they share the conservative belief that 
individuals (teachers and students) are largely responsible for the successes or failures of 
student academic performance. The goals of this program are commendable, but the 
methods by which the United States Department assesses teacher and student competency 
are misguided. Many of those proponents of the standards movement frame their 
arguments within America's lagging global economic competitiveness. This suggests a 
confused insistence that education follows the same rules as an economic system and, 
therefore, should be treated as a free market capitalist system by financially awarding 
those who succeed and punishing those who fail to meet academic standards. The 
educational system does not exist in a vacuum; its relationship to society cannot be easily 
separated. For example, Jean Anyon (2005) says that societal factors, such as poverty and 
geographic segregation, play primary roles in student academic achievement. These 
factors have nothing to do with the inherent abilities of either the student or teacher 
within the classroom. Diane Ravitch (2010), former United States Assistant Secretary of 
Education, argues that Race to the Top and other recent government policies aiming 
towards improving education value accountability and testing over a clear national 
curriculum strategy. Students must achieve proficiency in a particular subject, but it is 
left to each state to determine what proficiency actually means. In other words, what is 
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actually being taught is not as important as how it should be tested, and this suggests that 
scientific positivist models of assessment are mere patsies for the interests of the power 
bloc. While there is nothing inherently political in positivism, this epistemology is 
appropriated by the power bloc and used as ammunition to defend its claims of value-
neutral educational initiatives. In the drive to improve students' minds, the national 
standards movement undermines the more pressing need to collectively discuss what 
should and should not be included in a national curriculum, and consequently how this 
curriculum should be assessed. As the work of Apple (1990) informs, this discussion is 
easy to avoid because it compels us to focus on the inherent politics of curriculum, and 
most dangerously, to recognize those social groups who stand to gain from a curriculum 
that structurally disempowers those already marginalized and oppressed. 
 To answer what is lost when Enlightenment ideals are discouraged in education, a 
discussion of the dehumanizing force of skills-based education is necessary. In Public 
Education and the Public Space, Maxine Greene (1982) presents a manifesto for the 
politics of education. Like Biesta and Säfström (2011), she is arguing that the aims of 
education must be discovered in the liminal space between what is (education for the 
purposes of social adaptation and cohesion) and what is not yet (education for the 
purposes of teaching vociferously abstract concepts ultimately unattainable in the real 
world). She stresses the need for a public realm in educational discourse. By echoing 
Hannah Arendt's (1998) criticisms of the dehumanizing force of an increasingly 
diminutive public arena, or vita activa, Greene asserts that the plurality of individuals 
creates communities, and these communities allow individuals to put into practice shared 
"symbolism" (p. 5), such as the need for citizenship and the merits of a just society. In 
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The Human Condition, Arendt (1998) admonishes those past political theorists who place 
far too much emphasis on the merits of the individual and imply that a just society is best 
served by the imposition of one individual's perspective. Like Marx's history of Man with 
a capital M (rather than men, women, people) that views humans as bound by the 
deterministic forces of dialectical materialism, those who ignore the public realm offer a 
theory of the just society as one that alienates the individual and renders him impotent to 
make change. For Arendt (1998), the vita activa is one in which each person possesses 
the agency to create a new beginning, not only for himself but for the broader collective 
forces. Change is also central to Greene's argument for the aims of education; she warns 
us, "The opposite of freedom is a type of alienation; is it stasis, petrification, fixity" (p. 
4).  
 Demands for clarity in writing discourage students to challenge discursive 
practices and investigate how these practices function to indoctrinate social constructions 
of the aims of education which are presented as value-neutral and apolitical doctrines. For 
instance, take the rhetoric of literacy. This word has a heavy semiotic weight, but 
students may not be encouraged to assess its historical development and changing social 
meaning. Like all words, it is a construct, and it has had various associations throughout 
time. As mentioned, the Canadian government deems literacy synonymous with skills 
(Government of Canada, 2014), but this has not always been the case. In her essay 
Literacy, Lissa Paul (2011) traces the changing nature of this term so often uncritically 
employed by government and administration. Throughout the Reformation period, 
literacy meant the ability to read the Bible in order to achieve salvation. In the age of the 
Founding Fathers, as Greene mentions, literacy meant engagement in participatory 
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democracy. Only until the 19th century does this word take on its contemporary 
associations relating to skills and competency able to be measured empirically and 
quantifiably. Greene criticizes this modern usage when she laments that "literacy is talked 
of as if it were part of the gross national product" (p. 4). Today, the word literacy has 
been co-opted by the rhetoric of science, debasing language into a purely mechanical 
process of knowledge transmission. According to Greene, the moral implications of an 
educational discourse disinterested in morality are especially worrisome. In our 
technocratic age, we value narcissism, "deadness and emptiness in the public domain" 
(Greene, 1982, p. 5), and this results in existential despair or in Arendt's (1998) words, 
"world alienation" (p. 248). As we perceive ourselves to be simply consumers of 
education, we become passive figures, merely spectators removed from the public realm 
and, therefore, no longer complicit in educational policy. Trevor Norris (2011) argues 
that the perception of students as consumers rather than active citizens "undermines the 
critical task of education, reducing it to a process by which students become increasingly 
acquisitive yet decreasingly inquisitive" (p. 8). We blindly accept the experts who adopt 
the use of scientific rhetoric and convince us they know what is best for us. To seek the 
aims of education, Greene argues that we must have public education in a public space by 
compelling students to become civic-minded "thinker-actors" (p. 7). This will hopefully 
bring debates over morality and ethics back into the public realm of educational 
discourse.  
 This encroachment of "world alienation" (Arendt, 1998, p. 249) in the modern age 
may encourage existential nihilism, and this is perhaps one reason why secular 
theocracies exist in our educational systems. As we cast off the essentialist certainties of 
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religious convictions, we are still haunted by the desire to perhaps believe what we are 
told without thinking too critically. For instance, Max Weber (2006) argues that in 
classical economic theory, the Protestant "duty in one's calling," which once invigorated 
modern capitalism, is no longer needed, thus forgotten, but still "prowls about in our lives 
like the ghost of dead religious beliefs" (p. 124). In other words, the moral imperative to 
be responsible with one's finances still championed today by dyed-in-the-wool neo-
classical economists is subsumed by the "mechanical foundations" of "victorious 
capitalism," which uses human capital theory as a universal, predictive, value-neutral, 
and, therefore, amoral model of rational human behaviour (Weber, 2006, p. 124). This is 
an example of a system of human organization that arguably rests on some moral 
foundations which then becomes perceived as depoliticized. Zygmunt Bauman (2010) 
argues that in the contemporary world, groups seeking political and religious power 
operate "on the same territory" (p. 131). Modern states capitalize on existential insecurity 
for the self-reproduction of existing political and cultural institutions by touting a 
"secular fundamentalism": an ideology that must be "free of common and incurable 
human weakness, but also immune to human criticism and resistance" (Bauman, 2010, p. 
130). Both religious and secular fundamentalism is based on dogmatic faith in certainty. 
By referring to Gödel's incompleteness theorem, Bauman argues that the seemingly 
inexplicable truths of modern scientific thought render the individual impotent to tackle 
the problems he cannot reasonably comprehend. He says, 
Confronted with such problems, human logic risks floundering and foundering. 
Unable to twist the irrationalities it has spotted in the world to fit the tough frame 
of human reason, it cuts them off from the realm of human affairs and transports 
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them into regions acknowledged as inaccessible to human thought and action. (p. 
133) 
The events contributing to the 2008 global financial crisis provide a useful illustration of 
such unshakable faith in the doctrines of secular fundamentalism, specifically neo-
classical economics. Our adherence to the technological mindset may be one reason why 
derivatives programs, allegedly risk-adverse yet breathtakingly complex financial 
telecommunications systems, were so wholeheartedly adopted by the global banking 
system, even though hardly anyone using them could understand their architecture. 
Robert Gnaizda, former Policy Director for the consumer-advocacy organization 
Greelining Group, argued years before the crisis that these derivatives instruments were 
incomprehensible to most investors. When he presented Alan Greenspan, then Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve of the United States, with over 150 different complex adjustable-
rate mortgages offered by Citywide as an illustration, Greenspan freely admitted "if you 
had a doctorate in math, you wouldn't be able to understand them enough to know which 
was good for you and which wasn't" (as cited in Fergusen, 2010). Yet, Greenspan would 
not impose any regulatory restraints on such programs on ideological grounds. In a 2002 
speech entitled World Finance and Risk Management, Greenspan said "these increasingly 
complex financial instruments have been especial contributors, particularly over the past 
couple of stressful years, to the development of a far more flexible, efficient, and resilient 
financial system than existed just a quarter-century ago". These programs then facilitated 
among financial institutions the trading of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), 
which buried subprime mortgages within thousands of other loans and were then sold as 
packaged investments to third parties. Even today, there is widespread frustration that 
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many of the architects of the financial crisis, some of whom were aware that the AAA 
ratings tied to CDOs were bogus and even betted against the bull market immediately 
before the crash, have never been judiciously prosecuted. We have yet to learn the 
lessons from Iceland, when the citizens rose up in the public realm and demanded a 
fundamental structural change in their financial system.   
 Like Bauman (2010), Arendt (1998) makes clear that "[m]odern loss of faith is 
not religious in origin" (p. 253). By discussing events such as the launch of the first 
artificial satellite, global exploration, and the invention of the telescope, she argues that it 
is the modern scientific mindset, rather than anti-religious secularism per se, that has 
been "alienating man from his immediate earthly surroundings" (p. 251). This is a 
striking observation, since it is comfortable to think that once we throw off the exigencies 
of irrational religious convictions we place ourselves fully within the realm of logic and 
reason. Most educators (and English teachers) were once taught the Euclidean and 
Newtonian paradigms in their youth. In her discussion of Algebra, Arendt (1998) 
illustrates that modern scientific discovery has deeply complicated the Archimedean 
point, the vantage by which an observer can objectively apprehend the subject of 
investigation. We can no longer simply trust our ability to access empirical sense-data. 
Although modern science may be "credited with a demonstrable, ever-quickening 
increase in human knowledge and power",  
the same phenomenon is blamed with equal right for the hardly less demonstrable 
increase in human despair or the specifically modern nihilism . . . the modern 
astrophysical world view, which began with Galileo, and its challenge to the 
adequacy of the senses to reveal reality, have left us a universe of whose qualities 
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we know no more than the way they affect our measuring instruments . . . Instead 
of objective qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of nature 
or the universe -- in the words of Heisenberg -- man encounters only himself". 
(Arendt, 1998, p. 261) 
Perhaps this fear of nihilism lead those in the financial industries to place faith in 
derivatives, or those English teachers in my marking workshops to place faith in the 
scientific grading rubric. The increase in collective human knowledge of the world has 
paradoxically decreased assurance in our individual capacities for knowledge-acquisition. 
The secular theocracy at work here is the doctrine that broader systems of human 
organization, whether these determine your best financial investments or assess your 
English proficiency, must know more than we as individuals do.  
The Totalitarian Secular 
 There are serious moral repercussions to placing faith in a system which purports 
itself to be rational and objective. Both Arendt (1998) and Bauman (2000) warn us that 
our own humanity, or humanness, is at stake. Bauman's (2000) critique of modern 
sociology in Modernity and the Holocaust presents a chilling example of the 
consequences of such secular theocracy. Bauman (2000) argues that most sociological 
perspectives of the Holocaust tend to view the event as a barbaric interruption in the 
civilizing narrative of Western culture, only a temporary suspension of the intrinsically 
good force of purportedly scientific forms of organization. When viewing the Holocaust 
through this perspective,  
one thing that emerges from the experience of the Holocaust intact and unscathed 
is the humanizing and/or rationalizing (the two concepts are used synonymously) 
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impact of social organization upon inhuman drives which rule the conduct or pre- 
or anti-social individuals. Whatever moral instinct is to be found in human 
conduct is socially produced. It dissolves once society malfunctions. (Bauman, 
2000, p. 4) 
The belief that our animal savagery is tempered by social organization is a dangerous 
one, as Bauman (2000) goes on to argue vociferously that, in fact, the events of the 
Holocaust proceed from rational systems of social organization, such as bureaucracy, the 
scientific mindset, and the consignment of values to the realm of subjectivity. Being 
rational does not correlate to engaging in moral acts. For instance, dogmas of scientific 
positivism deem moral pronouncements unscientific, unfactual, and value-based because 
they cannot be situated as analytical or synthetic. This becomes an uncontested, 
axiomatic ideology, held by some with as much conviction as the belief in a personal 
god. The theoretical physicist Steven Weinberg (1999) once said, "Religion is an insult to 
human dignity. Without it you would have good people doing good things and evil 
people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion." He 
might be hard-pressed to acknowledge the secular nature of Hitler's program of 
endlosung, as Arendt and Bauman have taken great pains to demonstrate that Nazi 
ideology treated "denial of the authority of private conscience" and forced submission to 
ideology as the highest moral virtue (Bauman, 2000, p. 22). Discussions of the moral 
dimension of action, such as the sanctity of human life, were deliberately prevented from 
public discussion by the Nazi bureaucracy. Gas chambers were called bathrooms, for 
instance (Bauman, 2000, p. 12). Bauman (2000) terms this the "purposefully concealed . . 
. moral character of action" (p. 24). Not only were actions systematically sanitized of 
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their semiotic weight, many scholars have debunked the myth that most of the 
perpetrators themselves must have been barbaric criminals, miscreants, sadists, or other 
irrational types of abnormal humans. Kren and Rappoport (1980) note that based on 
survivor testimony, only about 10% of the SS could be considered abnormal according to 
conventional psychological criteria (p. 70). Members of the mobile killing units, the 
Einsatzgruppen, were conscripted precisely because they previously demonstrated 
businesslike and impersonal behaviour. Bauman (2000) writes, "Personal gains, and 
personal motives in general, were censured and penalized. Killings induced by desire or 
pleasure . . . could lead (at least in principle) to trial and conviction, like ordinary murder 
and manslaughter" (p. 20). Conversely, depersonalized murder, the employment of tasks 
according to the rational structures of Nazi bureaucratic order, were not considered moral 
actions, since it was a moral imperative to disassociate one's actions from one's 
conscience. 
 Discussions of Nazi ideology and the Holocaust may appear wildly inappropriate 
to the context of English language assessment, but my intention here is to disrupt the 
common-sense paradigm that rational systems of human organization are intrinsically 
amoral and value-neutral, and, thus, these structures can bring us no harm. There are, in 
fact, serious moral consequences to systems that encourage participants to disassociate 
actions from conscience in the guise of clarity or objectivity. Arendt (2006b) calls this 
state of mind "thoughtlessness," and her discussions of its ramifications provide for us a 
fitting application to the subject of English language learning and assessment. For 
language to be "clear" and "objective," as the COMM160 Course Outline demands, it 
must become in a sense depersonalized. Lynn Fendler (2012) argues that in the social 
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sciences and the humanities, there are two genres of texts: informational and generative. 
Informational texts are instructive and expository, while generative texts are "designed in 
generate in us experiences, feelings, and sensibilities" (p. 324). Fendler argues that 
generative texts are what make education educational. In order to teach critical literacy, 
for example, generative texts allow for a reflective analysis of the message's form and 
content. They demand students to position themselves as participants in the 
communicative process as not only receiver but interpreter of meaning, "to generate 
understandings in us" (Fendler, 2012, p. 324). Clarity and interpretation are not 
necessarily at odds with each other; rather to think of texts as generative helps one to 
clarify the politicized rhetoric of clarity, the politics of clarity. This understanding of 
communication is postmodern-oriented, since it recognizes the distinction between signs 
and signifiers; words have no intrinsic meaning, and it is only "the corporate body" 
(Quine, 1970, p. 47) that determines meaning by consensus. Conversely, informational 
texts are like road signs; they are meant to convey meaning ideally without any 
interpretation/interference from the receiver. By its nature, these texts are depersonalized, 
since they attempt to transmit meaning universally.  
 The moral dimensions of informational and generative texts are more easily 
appreciated when we see how different disciplines perceive the activity of writing. In 
scientific writing, accuracy, clarity, and economy are lauded, while in the humanities 
often the work itself is the embodiment of understanding achieved. An explication of the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics has very different aims than those of a high modernist 
novel, for instance, although the desire for the reader to simply understand is perhaps 
common to all writing. However, the assumption of intentionality is what differentiates 
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various writing. Many novelists abhor explaining the message of their texts, since it 
undermines the texts’ generative function (Pullman, 2011, p. 128). In scholarly writing, 
intentionality is perhaps more strongly desired, although this will vary according to the 
scholar and the discipline. In scientific writing though, the author's intention is central. 
There is a moral element to the teaching of informational, rather than generative, writing 
because informational writing is often praised to the detriment of generative writing in 
higher education. This praise then extends to the "utilitarian public language of modern 
liberal democracies," as Stefan Collini (1993) explains: 
Language that is intensely suspicious of non-demonstrable judgments of quality 
and intolerant of non-quantifiable assertions of value, makes it easier to justify 
fundamental research in the natural sciences, with its promise of medical, 
industrial, and similar  applications, than to justify what is anyways only with 
some awkwardness called 'research' in the humanities. (p. lx) 
While it is obvious that an explication of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is 
thoughtful, it is also anonymous, since the message is meant to be the same no matter the 
writer. Students are being indoctrinated to believe that nonutilitarian, artistic, literary, 
generative language is useless and unnecessary for their educational attainment and 
future careers in the social realm. They are encouraged to write anonymously, and a by-
product of this manner of communicating is a form of thoughtlessness: a message 
divorced from the personality of the author, in which only the signal matters, rather than 
the sender and receiver as well. There is much anonymous writing on the internet, and 
historically many authors have chosen to publish under pseudonyms, but my criticism 
here is that anonymous writing should not be imposed and taught as superior to other 
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varieties. Martha Nussbaum (2010) argues that people behave immorally when the threat 
of personal accountability is taken away: "People act much worse under shelter of 
anonymity, as parts of a faceless mass, than they do when they are watched and made 
accountable as individuals" (p. 43). In a polemic against the increasing devaluation of 
humanities-oriented education, she cites many sociological studies, such as the famous 
Zimbardo Stanford Prison Experiment and the Milgram Experiment on Obedience to 
Authority Figures, as examples that attest to the moral repercussions of enforced 
anonymity.  
 This may all seem excessive, since English teachers are not exactly grooming 
prison guards. However, there are consequences to instructing students to write in a 
depersonalized, anonymous fashion, as a scientist would write, in order to convey an 
ideally universal message. It is ultimately dehumanizing. In Politics and the English 
Language, George Orwell (1946a) warns us that "if thought corrupts language, language 
can also corrupt thought" (p. 262). In his diatribe against phraseology, such as fixed 
expressions and clichés, he argues that modern writing avoids using words for the sake of 
their meaning, and instead ties together "ready-made phrases" (Orwell, 1946a, p. 258). 
Orwell (1946a) calls this a "lifeless, imitative style" which has now become orthodoxy in 
current political discourse (p. 258). It is bad writing to use vague expressions, so there is 
an imperative to use expressions consented to by the “corporate body” (Quine, 1970, p. 
47), but it is also bad writing to uncritically adopt previously identified expressions 
because it discourages the writer from creating his own imagery to breathe new semiotic 
life into those words and expressions. As Orwell (1946a) notes,   
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When one watches some tired hack on the platform mechanically repeating the 
familiar phrases . . . one often has a curious feeling that one is not watching a live 
human being but some kind of dummy . . . A speaker who uses that kind of 
phraseology has gone some distance toward turning himself into a machine. The 
appropriate noises are coming out of  his larynx, but his brain is not involved as it 
would be if he were choosing his words for himself. If the speech he is making is 
one that he is accustomed to make over and over again, he may be almost 
unconscious of what he is saying, as one is when one utters the responses in 
church. (p. 258) 
A depersonalizing force is a dehumanizing force; it diminishes the individual agency of 
the communicator and renders him a passive mechanism.  
 In her report on the Eichmann trial, Arendt (2006b) argues that the accused's self-
deception, rather than overt mendacity, played a larger role in his criminal behaviour as a 
leading organizer of the Holocaust. She argues that Eichmann aspired to be an "idealist," 
one who had "his personal feelings and emotions, but would never permit them to 
interfere with his actions if they came into conflict with his 'idea'" (p. 42). By inverting 
Weisenberg's comment that one needs religion to compel good people to do evil things, 
we may conclude that a blind faith in any ideology, including a secular theocracy, may 
lead good people to do evil things. When examining transcripts of the police 
examinations and the trial, Arendt (2006b) concludes that Eichmann was able to self-
deceive by his use of depersonalized, anonymous language. She calls his words "stock 
phrases," "slogans," and "Officialese" (the German word Amptssprache translating 
loosely as "department German"; Arendt, 2006b, p. 48). Judges called it "empty talk" 
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when he repeated verbatim the same phrases in trial as he did during police examinations, 
and though they believed this emptiness was insincere, Arendt (2006b) argues that she 
witnessed how language can, in fact, corrupt thought: 
the longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to 
speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the 
standpoint of somebody else. No communication was possible with him, not 
because he lied but because he was surrounded by the most reliable of all 
safeguards against the words and the presence of others, and hence against reality 
as such. (p. 49) 
Nussbaum (2010) echoes Arendt's (2006b) assessment of Eichmann when she argues that 
"the ability to imagine sympathetically the predicament of another person" (p. 7) is a 
crucial ability for a healthy democracy. In totalitarian states or secular theocracies, this 
ability is actively discouraged.  
 In COMM160, students are actively encouraged to dehumanize their writing in 
two significant ways: to write stock phrases, and to conform to correct paragraph 
formatting. These rules condition students to develop an aversion to moral discourse. 
Although they may be prompted to state value-judgments, it is ultimately insincere, since 
the value-judgments are superficial and vapid. Gert Biesta (2012) notes the difference 
between what he terms a mechanistic versus a pragmatic communication process. Stock 
phrases, where meaning is closed-ended, reflects the mechanistic conception of 
communication, which asserts that effective communication is only possible when there 
is a basis of common understanding (Biesta, 2012, p. 3). Although Biesta acknowledges 
nothing suspect in this process in principle, he argues for the need to foster the pragmatic 
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conception of communication in the classroom as well. Pragmatic communication 
celebrates creation and transformation to create newness, or a "third space" or an "open 
gap" where novel meanings and "new events" can occur (Biesta, 2012, p. 4). Arendt 
(1998) similarly argues for the possibility of "natality" in political discourse (p. 247). 
Methods of assessment based purely on a mechanistic conception attempt to close this 
gap by sanctioning what is correct and incorrect about communication:  
Given that assessment, rather than teaching or pedagogy, is the key process in 
closing the educational gap, it is perhaps not without significance that teaching 
and pedagogy are increasingly being replaced by and redefined as assessment, 
thus running the risk of driving the event out of education. (Biesta, 2012, p. 4) 
An examination of COMM160's grading rubric reveals that students are very much 
rewarded when they engage in "empty talk" (Arendt, 2006b, p. 49). In order to be 
assessed as an A student, writing must be "clear," "concrete," "coherent," "accurate," and 
"effective." As mentioned, mechanistic communication has its merits. It instructs students 
on logical argumentative progression, and encouraging them to communicate in the 
manner of T. S. Eliot's poetry is not exactly appropriate. However, there must be a middle 
ground, and a rigid adherence to mechanistic communication is dehumanizing because it 
implicitly encourages students to simplify complex subject matter or avoid it altogether. 
For example, in a recent class, I assigned an article on conflict minerals in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. My intention was to urge students to reflect upon their 
own indirect involvement in the brutal social conditions in Congo, how their 
consumption of technological devices may be connected to child labour in another part of 
the world. I chose this topic because I was frustrated by my department's 
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recommendations of reading material, which consisted of largely sanitized and apolitical 
topics related to social networking and cell phones. However, the requirement that 
students conform to correct paragraph formatting led me to compel students to write 
response paragraphs that dangerously simplified the issue. Students must write a clear 
argument in the first sentence, and previous faculty marking workshops had stressed the 
desire for them to state an argument that can be coherently defended in one paragraph. I 
asked the question, "Who is to blame for the existence of child labour in Congo?" One 
student told me that this question was too difficult to answer, for there are many groups 
that collectively bear responsibility, such as Western governments and consumers, global 
corporations, and the Congolese militias. I told him to disregard the complexity, keep it 
simple and pick one group, which I now deeply regret. When I discussed my concerns 
with the department chair, he informed me that there is a division between art and 
communication, and in order to teach students to effectively communicate, we must avoid 
controversial topics such as politics. Utilitarian language breeds utilitarian thought.  
 My main concern with the grading rubric in COMM160 is that its implicit 
encouragement to dehumanize communication undermines its competing claim to 
explicitly encourage critical thinking. According to the course learning outcomes outlined 
in the Course Outline, students must "apply critical thinking skills;" in order to receive an 
A, students must demonstrate "evidence of critical thinking" (Centennial College, 2014a). 
Yet, the assessment criteria is fundamentally contradictory and favours dehumanized 
writing, since critical thinking, taken to its logical conclusion, ultimately undermines the 
impetus to write anonymously (or scientifically). By the term's very nature, critical 
thinking has many variations in meaning. Based on analyses of several research studies, 
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Molnar, Boninger, and Fogarty (2011) posit that critical thinkers "can take different 
points of view; they can identify, understand, and evaluate the assumptions, point of 
view, and logic behind a given position or proposed solution to a problem; and, they can 
generate and evaluate alternative solutions" (p. 4). Critical thinking is a contextual and 
nonmechanistic communication process that assumes the student possesses the agency to 
come up with novel ideas. According to Perkins and Grotzer (1997), it encourages 
"cognitive reorganization" by acknowledging complexities and fostering 
"metacognition", the process of monitoring and managing one's thinking (p. 1128).  
Ritchhart and Perkins (2005) argue that we all have natural cognitive tendencies that run 
counterintuitive to critical thought. For example, we tend towards favourably biasing our 
presuppositions, we draw upon limited evidence to reach conclusions, we invent 
categories and classifications prematurely, and we favour emotional responses over 
deliberate thinking (Ritchhart & Perkins, 2005, p. 775). Therefore, the educational setting 
is essential to nurture a student's critical capacities in order to become a "knowledge 
builder" and "problem solver" (Ritchhart & Perkins, 2005, p. 776). The authors cite many 
recent research studies revealing that higher education biases knowledge and skills 
acquisition over critical thinking. Perhaps this is because critical thinking would 
eventually lead students to question the epistemological basis for assessment and, 
therefore, undermine the authority of the institution and its methods of scientific 
positivism. Humanized writing leads to dissent because it celebrates the uniqueness and 
individual agency of the student. Cognitive development is a morally neutral activity, but 
the foundations for moral discourse rest upon the act of critical reflection. Critical 
thinking prompts autonomous moral inquiry. If morals are predetermined, then there is no 
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need for moral inquiry, but if students are encouraged to tolerate ambiguity, they will be 
led to undermine the shaky foundations of assessing clear and correct writing and the 
validity of the grading criteria would crumble. Instead, critical thinking is kept in its place 
in order to prevent dissenters from openly questioning the authority of the institution and 
its untenable claim to be able to effectively assess communication skills. It is too easy to 
justify such an approach by stating that utilitarian writing is necessary in remedial 
learning, that you need to master this form before moving upwards cognitively. In 
practice, and speaking from experience, students must be initially encouraged to assume 
the role of "thinker-actors" (Greene, 1982, p. 7) or they will resist any other pedagogical 
approach. Critical thinking must come first; it is the combustible force which excites the 
student to simply begin to engage in writing instruction.  
 A tolerance for ambiguity and a suspicion of presupposed certainties are 
reflections of what I term postmodern-oriented pedagogies, which tend to perceive 
knowledge as social constructions.2 In the study of the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
many theorists have asserted that science does not present a faithful reflection of reality. 
Wolf Lepenies (1989) argues that scientific knowledge is a "cultural system [that] 
exhibits to us an alienated interest-determined reflection of reality specific to a definite 
time and place" (p. 68). Stefan Collini (1993) notes that the field of literary theory has 
"reached out to subsume science under its characteristically corrosive categories: science, 
too, it is argued, is a discourse, involving the same kinds of rhetorical strategies, literary 
tropes, and unstable meanings as other forms of writing" (p. l). Locke (1992), Latour and 
Woolgar (1979), and Barnes, Bloor, and Henry (1996) have performed exhaustive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  It should be noted here that postmodernism is not the only approach which celebrates critical pedagogy. 
Western thinking since Plato has engaged in this inquiry in some form or another. However, I will discuss 
postmodernism as it relates to critical pedagogy because historically it is responding to modernity.	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sociological studies to argue for the social construction of scientific knowledge. In The 
Social Construction of What?, Ian Hacking (1999) engaged in a meta-analysis of 
academic debates over social construction theory in order to test the theory's limits. Many 
opponents of social constructionism argue that this line of reasoning will lead one down a 
rabbit-hole of total relativism. Some might argue that this is a misappropriation of 
postmodern epistemology. Regardless, it is my opinion that this is an unresolvable 
debate, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to side one way or the other. I do not 
intend for my criticisms of scientific positivism as assessment criteria, for instance, to 
convince the reader of the total social construction of scientific knowledge. In fact, 
convictions of total relativism would undermine my agenda to integrate critical thinking 
and humanized writing into the curriculum. If concepts such as truth and reality are 
constructions, if any opinion or idea is as good as the other, if religious fundamentalism 
is just as valid as the laws of physics, then there is no structural basis to determine issues 
of morality. As Hacking notes,  
Today’s English-language traditions of political theory emphasize individual 
liberty and individual rights. Human beings are thought of as self-subsistent atoms 
who enter into relationships with other human beings. . . Such pictures invite us to 
think that first there are individual ‘‘selves,’’ and then there are societies. . . . 
People who subscribe to this  vision or strategy find talk of social construction 
suspect. (p. 15)  
 My interest is not in the ideas of social construction theory and other postmodern-
oriented pedagogies, but rather how these ideas become actualized in the structures of 
higher education, since my argument rests on the manifestation of the power dynamics of 
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competing epistemologies. At Centennial College, postmodern-oriented pedagogies are 
merely paid lip service, because it is essential to keep strict limits on social construction 
theory for the maintenance of secular theocracies. Multiculturalism is the mantra 
ideology of 21st century education. It is a part of the college's mission statement to "value 
and respect multicultural diversity" (Centennial College, 2014c). While public discourse 
on the moral quandaries of multiculturalism must rest on the separation of race/ethnicity 
and culture, certain subjects within education fail to recognize this division and, thus, 
become off-limits. Issues of culture become charged as racist indictments. An argument 
against Israeli settlements on the West Bank is deemed anti-Semitic. An argument against 
the hijab as oppressive against women's rights is deemed Islamophobic. These are 
important discussions to have, but they are actively silenced in the classroom. Thus, the 
multicultural ideology becomes an uncontested belief, a secular theocracy which 
discourages democratic participation in moral discourse. Most dangerously, the ideology 
of multiculturalism is a distraction; it provides a veneer of inclusivity to subvert the 
questioning of more surreptitious, all-encompassing cultures in which all students are 
commanded to participate, such as consumerism, capitalism, and the integration of 
technology in the classroom. As Chris Hedges (2009b) argues, slogans of diversity 
shroud multiculturalism's "silent partner:" “the fragmentation of student society into 
diverse but disarmed droplets" (p. 93). For instance, Centennial's mission statement also 
refers to students as "human resources", and it affirms its desire to adopt "state-of-the-art 
information technologies" (Centennial College, 2014c). Social construction theory is 
tolerated if it celebrates boutique multiculturalism, but it resists its application to the 
corporate model of higher education, for instance. Michael W. Apple (1990) calls this the 
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“hidden curriculum,” the implied normative values about what is legitimate knowledge 
and what is not (p. 14). As discussed, scientific positivist epistemology is still adopted 
without question as valid assessment in COMM160, even while the cafeteria proudly 
serves food from around the world. For those faculty selected to participate in course 
development, the training software concretely reveals this hidden curriculum. In order to 
conform to the predetermined digital course outline template, faculty must ensure that 
learning outcomes are "observable and measurable" (Centennial College, 2014d), so that 
they meet 2-4 Essential Employability Skills decreed by the Canadian government. Then, 
a faculty member's completed template must be approved by the Centre for Academic 
Quality, the centralized administrative and bureaucratic department of the college. Each 
learning outcome is assessed such that it can be quantitatively verified and then mapped 
onto an existing template of learning outcomes preapproved by the Canadian 
government. During a conversation with a colleague who performs this mapping, I 
learned that the program is structurally flawed. A hierarchy of values cannot be ascribed 
to each learning outcome, and, therefore, the program perceives each outcome as having 
equal weight. One learning outcome may be overrepresented while another may be 
underrepresented, thereby distorting the course developer's intentions. However, those 
who perform mapping are only using the program's interface; they are victim to its 
complex architecture. The ideology of scientific assessment is so powerful that even 
those who implement assessment criteria are aware of the system's internal errors, yet are 
powerless to make any corrections. 
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Discourses of Critical Thought 
 It is important to ask if critical thinking and broader debates over moral issues 
should even be the responsibility of institutions of higher education. The most candid 
defender of an amoral model of schooling is Stanley Fish, whose series of articles on the 
topic have sparked debate over the place of morality in the classroom. Fish (2003) argues 
that democratic and academic values are mutually exclusive. While he accepts that the 
preparation for democratic citizenship is a noble task, it must be beyond the scope of the 
institution in order to maintain a disengaged and neutral political stance. Some of his 
reasons are valid. For instance, moral instruction may lead to discipleship and confusing 
education with emotional therapy. He asserts that is simply not the institution's 
responsibility to engage in moral instruction (Fish, 2004). My opposition to Fish 
(2003/2004) rests on four objections. Firstly, academic virtues are inseparable from moral 
virtues. Demands for honesty, integrity, and thoughtfulness in scholarship equally extend 
to democratic participation. A student who plagiarizes or purchases essays is akin to a 
politician who lies and refuses to stand by his previous comments in public address. 
Secondly, teachers do not need to bias the classroom dynamic by making moral 
pronouncements. There is a difference between explicit moral instruction and the 
allowance for discussions of moral inquiry. Thirdly, paternalism is not necessarily a bad 
word. At times, education must be paternalistic to an extent in order to have a fighting 
chance against the paternalism of those economic groups who seek to benefit from our 
illusions that some structures in our educational system are purely instrumental. For 
instance, the encroachment of commercialism may be viewed as a celebration of the 
freedom to choose. However, students as consumers in a sphere of unrestrained 
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capitalism can develop a false sense of autonomy, and, thus, will not develop the critical 
capacities to recognize the antidemocratic forces at work in school commercialism. The 
ability to choose between various Coke products is not exactly freedom of choice. As 
Chris Hedges (2009a) argues, "unfettered capitalism is the misguided belief that personal 
style, mistaken for individualism, is the same as democratic equality." The corporate 
desire to make students consumers may involve a process of reducing the efficacy of 
education's goal to make them better citizens. For example, teaching right from wrong 
may be at odds with Coke's goal to increase consumption in schools, since critical 
thinking of ethics and morality may lead students to be brand disloyal and challenge the 
hegemony of their products and their illusion of choice.  
 My fourth objection is based upon criticisms offered by Stanley Hauerwas (2010), 
Terry Eagleton (1995), and Noam Chomsky (2014). Hauerwas argues the issue of money 
is completely absent from Fish's protests against moral education (p. 99). Educational 
institutions run on money, whether they are for-profit universities in the United States or 
government-subsidized ones in Canada. Centennial College would close its doors if 
enrollment suddenly vanished. Although Fish explicitly rejects that universities should be 
in the business of vocational training, "he has never apologized for being well-paid" (as 
cited in Hauerwas, 2010, p. 99). This may seem like ad hominum, but Hauerwas brings 
up a deeply salient point. Fish is currently a tenured professor at the Cardozo School of 
Law in New York City. It is a private institution with a tuition of $51,208 for the 2013-
2014 year that openly advertises its postgraduate employment statistics online (Cardozo 
School of Law, 2014). It is unclear to what extent this school is adopting the corporate 
model, but Fish's desire to teach a liberal education in a political vacuum is difficult to 
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accept on the surface. As Hauerwas (2010) argues, "whoever it is that values liberal 
education needs to sustain that education with the only measure we have of value, that is, 
money" (p. 99). Terry Eagleton (1995), in his review of Fish's book Professional 
Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change, argues that Fish's rejection of both 
the humanist study of literature, with its overt moral dimensions, and the political 
approach to use literature to make better citizens has left him "without any justification 
for his work as a literary critic" (p. 6). As enrolment in literary studies dwindle each year, 
Fish may be hard-pressed to acknowledge that his position as tenured professor may 
make his arguments against the political nature of academia less than valid. Noam 
Chomsky (2014) and Benjamin Ginsberg (2011) have written about the corporate model 
of modern universities, and how tenured positions are becoming more and more scarce. 
Chomsky argues that it is essential for these corporations to "increase labor servility" by 
hiring faculty off the tenure track, because this keeps them "docile and obedient." The 
precarious teaching position reflects the neoliberal phenomenon of running institutions of 
higher education like a business. It creates a climate of fear and insecurity, and it compels 
faculty to avoid asking for higher wages, or to go on strike. I am a contract instructor at 
an Ontario community college, and my position has been perpetually precarious since I 
began teaching in 2009. Every term, I am officially re-hired (hopefully), and it is often 
only a few weeks before the start of the new term when I know if I will be able to pay my 
mortgage. I recently received an offer to teach this summer, and its language highlights 
the precarious nature of my position: it is only a "tentative" offer that is "contingent on 
enrolment numbers," and "this may result in a change to [my] employment status." In 
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other words, I should be happy with what I get so don't complain. Chomsky (2014) 
speaks about the alleged need for worker 'flexibility': 
The idea that labor should meet the conditions of “flexibility” is just another 
standard technique of control and domination. Why not say that administrators 
should be thrown out if there’s nothing for them to do that semester, or trustees -- 
what do they have to be there for? The situation is the same with top management 
in industry: if labor has to be flexible, how about management? 
Fish is in a privileged position to demand amoral education because he benefits from a 
neoliberal, corporate model of higher learning that has personally favoured him. Moral 
inquiry must be a part of the curricula because it is already there, albeit disguised, in the 
fundamental institutional superstructures. Money talks. The ideal of an amoral model is 
merely a specter, and those who sell us this myth may be benefitting from the power 
structures that perpetuate this specter. The crisis in education, largely framed in a 
postfinancial crisis mindset, is used as an instrument of domination. A crisis keeps 
dissenters at bay. A crisis creates a heightened feeling of job insecurity, that money will 
be taken away from us at any notice, and it compels us to accept the most fundamental 
presupposition of the model of higher education in the 21st century: the corporate 
institution. Treating students and faculty as human resources, amending curricula to teach 
skills rather than literacy, adopting ineffective but ideologically-sound assessment criteria 
based on scientific rationalism, and favouring vocational learning while discrediting the 
value of humanities-oriented disciplines is a deeply moral issue, yet it is presented to us 
time and time again as value-neutral, amoral, and apolitical, and, therefore, beyond the 
scope of moral inquiry. This educational superstructure has dire moral reverberations if 
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we do not foster the competency in students and teachers to actively question these most 
dominant and oppressive axioms of educational models, even if there is no visible tyrant 
at the helm. As Arendt (1998) argues in reference to modern bureaucracy: "the rule by 
nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn 
out to be one of its crudest and most tyrannical versions” (p. 40). 
 It is conceptually challenging to discuss a system of domination whereby nobody 
is ruling. Chomsky (2014) argues when speaking about corporations, we must distinguish 
the individual from the institution. Forms of tyranny are inherently monstrous, and while 
individuals participating in that system may be benevolent, "in their institutional role, 
they're monstrous, because the institution is monstrous" (Achbar & Abbot, 2005). 
Sheldon Wolin's (2008) concept of inverted totalitarianism is helpful to understand how 
a monstrous institution can be collectively made up of individuals who are not monstrous, 
where participants can propagate ideology without being completely cognizant of the 
ideology itself. Elucidated in his book, Democracy Incorporated, Wolin offers an 
expansive and complex argument, but his articulation of how antidemocratic, imperialist, 
and dogmatic forces can rein in a supposedly democratic American society offers a 
conceptual framework for my arguments within an educational context. In a speech given 
in 1918, Max Weber spoke of the process of "disenchantment" when Western society 
transitioned from traditional and religious to modern and secular. Bureaucratic and 
rational systems of human organization mean that: 
there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one 
can, in  principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is 
disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to 
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master or implore the spirits,  as did the savage, for whom such mysterious 
powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service. (Weber, 
1918, p. 8) 
Since then, many thinkers have challenged the claim that modern society is totally devoid 
of magical means. Bauman (2010) links religious and secular fundamentalist ideologies. 
Arendt (1998) states, "Modern loss of faith is not religious in origin" (p. 253). Trevor 
Norris (2011) argues that modern consumer culture is driven not by a Protestant ethic of 
self-denial, as Weber (1918) characterized capitalism in his time, but rather hedonism: 
contemporary capitalism "is not necessarily driven by a pervasive rationalization of all 
aspects of human life and social existence, but often by irrationality and desire" (p. 25). 
One could interpret irrationality as magical means. Wolin (2008) asserts that Weber 
underestimated our inherent desire for credulity, and there is much myth to be found in an 
age with the veneer of scientific rationalism (p. 12). He differentiates modern American 
myth as constitutional imaginary and power imaginary, one being a democratic belief, 
the other being antidemocratic, based on "sanctified" authority (Wolin, 2008, p. 20). Note 
the religious vocabulary. This power imaginary grew to prominence in American thought 
immediately after WWII, as the nation became a Cold War Superpower, and this new 
imaginary displaced the New Deal-inspired constitutional imaginary of the pre-WWII 
period. America had a new duty to maintain its status as the global military and economic 
authority, paradoxically by using any means available, even imperialist dictates, to 
preserve freedom for the American populace and, secondarily, for the rest of the free 
world. Wolin calls this ethos the new "civil religion," in which any dissidents 
(communists, pacifists, defender of New Deal social policies) are deemed blasphemous 
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heretics in a new universal, state-sanctioned morality (p. 37). Enter inverted 
totalitarianism, "a set of effects produced by actions or practices undertaken in ignorance 
of their lasting consequences," the two most worrisome practices being "the acceptance 
of restraints on personal freedom and being resigned to political impotence" (Wolin, 
2008, p. 42). The disintegration of the public realm and the emergence of the social (in 
the words of Arendt) have led to a fundamental reconstruction of power arrangements 
which inhibit individual freedom. What is most insidious about inverted totalitarianism is 
that it "professes to be the opposite of what, in fact it is" (Wolin, 2008, p. 46). We are 
deluded into thinking we live in a democratic society; this becomes the myth, the magical 
mean, that shrouds the imperialist, antidemocratic political and economic oligarchies that 
rule by managed democracy. Even in a Canadian context, we take comfort in believing 
what we are not. We draw our own Iron Curtain across the 49th parallel. We tell 
ourselves we celebrate multiculturalism while Americans enforce the doctrine of 
assimilation. However, our institutions of higher education bear more resemblance to the 
for-profit schools in America as we would like to think: “Managed democracy is centered 
on containing electoral politics; it is cool, even hostile toward social democracy beyond 
promoting literacy, job training, and other essentials for a society struggling to survive in 
the global economy. Managed democracy is democracy systematized” (Wolin, 2008, p. 
47). A quick glance at the Canadian government's Essential Employability Skills, which 
conflate literacy and skills, or Centennial College's (2014) mission statement to "provide 
employers and communities with the human resources they will require for economic 
success and contribution to the community," reveals that both Canadian and American 
educational institutions serve the same masters. 
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 Chris Hedges' (2009b) criticisms of the encroachment of corporate culture in all 
aspects of American life demonstrate how the idea of freedom is misappropriated and 
abused by the doctrines of neo-classical economic and human capital theory. It is a 
fallacy to conflate freedom of democracy and so-called freedom of the free market. He 
claims that we live in an "empire of illusion" whereby our faith in consumerism as an 
expression of democracy is "our culture's secular version of being born again", in which 
to dissent is to be branded an "apostate" (Hedges, 2009b, p. 53). In the institutions of 
higher education, students are taught deference to authority so as not to question its "self-
justifying" corporate structure (Hedges, 2009b, p. 90). Thus they are taught skills rather 
than literacy, answers rather than values. Students should be taught all of the above. 
Language holds power, and demands for clear and correct writing limit our ability to 
undermine and subvert. I am reminded of the cannibalized language Newspeak in 
Orwell's (1989) Nineteen Eighty-Four, intended to make speech "independent of 
consciousness" and therefore expressions of "unorthodox opinions" or "heresies" nearly 
impossible (p. 323). The humanities must be devalued to organize education around 
brutally utilitarian language, "predetermined answers to predetermined questions" 
(Hedges, 2009b, p. 103). Therefore, the corporate model of education becomes 
axiomatic, and issues of conscience and morality become irrelevant. Economy takes 
precedence over politics in the inverted model of classical totalitarianism (Wolin, 2008, 
p. 38). The most fundamental tenet of this new orthodoxy is that the corporate model is 
naturally democratic, which Hedges (2009b) criticizes: 
Democracy is not an outgrowth of free markets. Democracy and capitalism are 
antagonistic entities. Democracy, like individualism, is based not on personal gain 
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but on  self-sacrifice. A functioning democracy must often defy the economic 
interests of elites on behalf of the citizens. (p. 185) 
Yet, illusion becomes a "utopian faith" in the supposed freedom of the corporate and 
consumer models of education (Hedges, 2009a), an artifice, a belief without 
understanding. In his essay, The Prevention of Literature, Orwell (1946b) warns that "a 
society becomes totalitarian when its structure becomes flagrantly artificial." The 
supremacy of economics over politics can be illustrated by the fact that the belief in 
vocational education transcends the political spectrum here in Canada. Trevor Norris 
(2014) notes that philosophies of both the Left and Right can betray humans as economic 
creatures. The education policy initiatives proposed by Andrea Horwath and the Ontario 
NDP Party are framed as making higher education more affordable to increase job 
opportunities in a global economy (Ontario NDP, 2014). Similarly, Tim Hudak and the 
Ontario PC Party state that  
a twenty-first century post-secondary education system must meet the needs of a 
twenty-first century economy. The make-up of our higher learning system in 
Ontario must reflect the requirements of the jobs of the present and future . . . to 
reflect economic realities. (Ontario PC, 2014)  
 Consumerism becomes the magical means in our institutions of higher education. 
Tal Gilead (2012) argues that since the 1960s, human capital theory has provided the 
basis for the material objectives of educational attainment in the broader economy. This 
theory is the mechanism by which neo-classical economics infiltrate the institution of 
higher education: students are treated as economic investments. Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011) argue that a significant disadvantage of this approach is unobserved heterogeneity, 
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which is the presumption that all differences among students, such as educational 
attainment, post-graduation employment, and job satisfaction, can be attributed to the 
acquisition (of failure to acquire) quantifiable skills (p. 3).  As consumers with apparent 
freedoms, students are led to believe through the rhetoric of human capital that their 
success or failure in the institution rests on them alone. While it is dehumanizing to treat 
humans primarily as gears in a greater economic machine, reducing education to a 
functionalist model solely to serve existing economic needs, it also dangerously ignores 
and fails to take notice of existing power structures that replicate existing social 
inequalities. If students fail to contribute to the economy, they are led to believe they 
have only themselves to blame. This force of individualization, whereby individuals are 
more frequently required to construct their own identities, is discussed in-depth by 
Bauman (2001) in The Individualized Society. This mantra of late modernity becomes a 
secular theocracy. Hedges (2009a) abhors economic theories that perceive humans as 
simply objects whose worth are determined by the market, when they no longer recognize 
that they possess a "sacred dimension." He says, "in America most human beings have 
been conditioned to view themselves as marketable commodities. They are objects like 
consumer products. They have no intrinsic value". The corporate educational model sells 
itself as amoral, and, therefore, absolves itself of any moral consequences that follow 
from it. Students learn to write in stock phrases and clichés, to write scientifically and 
avoid moral inquiry. Hedges (2009b) calls this the language of television, and argues that 
"the culture of illusion thrives by robbing us of the intellectual and linguistic tools to 
separate illusion from truth" (p. 45). In a system whereby humans are considered 
commodities, we are used and discarded without being given the means to articulate 
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dissent. Arendt's (1998) cognizance of world alienation and collective anxiety becomes 
usurped by "the cheerful conformity" of Hedges' (2009a) empire of illusion. 
 In this chapter, I have outlined the moral repercussions of various forms of secular 
faith to demonstrate how any belief without understanding can be dangerous. In an 
educational context, I termed this a secular theocracy based on a progress theology, and 
it is an inversion of the traditional dogmas of religious rhetoric in three ways:  
1. It purports itself to be amoral. 
2. It purports itself to be rational, based on scientific knowledge. 
3. It dehumanizes the individual (in Christine doctrine, although the human is 
made from ashes, he is paradoxically the centre of the universe, so there is 
narcissism along with flagellation).  
Religion does not hold a monopoly over the transcendent. As Wolin (2008) states, we 
must not underestimate our desire for credulity. Our economic models of human 
development, our need to increase capital, are constructions which have become 
perceived as ineffable nonconstructions of human organization. So much scientific 
theory, the rhetoric co-opted by economics, seems incomprehensible to us, so we retreat 
from the public realm and place more faith in our illusions of democratic freedom as 
consumers within the social. We convince ourselves that principles of reductionism do 
not degrade the sanctity of human life, yet moral nihilism is at the heart of corporate 
culture, and by proxy our educational culture. We have cast off the exigencies of 
religious instruction, and, thus, any inquiries of moral import are subjugated to the 
margins of academic respectability along with the other humanities-oriented disciplines. 
We continue to fall victim to the immoral repercussions of an education system that cares 
104 
 
 
not for democratic participation, but only satisfying the needs of our political institutions 
in bed with the corporate oligarchy. In our deluded state, we tout the freedom of a 
consumerist model of higher education, one in which we believe gives more freedom to 
the individual but instead robs us of the tools to protest. We manufacture a secular 
theocracy to cope with the anxieties and fears prevalent in a world in which a degree 
credential has less and less social capital and fails to guarantee us a meaningful and well-
paid career after graduation. If we continue to choose belief without understanding, if we 
do not challenge the uncontested axioms of corporate educational models, we will 
continue to be haunted by those ghosts of dead religious beliefs without even knowing it. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCLUSION 
 This thesis is a warning to those institutions of higher education that continue to 
devalue the arts and humanities, for these disciplines can undermine the doctrines of 
modernity and thus threaten the political status quo of the institution's authority. Of 
course, science and economics, for instance, can adopt arts- and humanities-oriented 
approaches. True scientific inquiry demands creativity, critical thinking, and the 
questioning of all our epistemological assumptions. Marx was an economist. However, 
with the continued entrenchment of neoliberalism and scientism in educational policy, the 
political nature of such questioning is more necessary than ever, and so all the disciplines 
must equip themselves with this task.  
 We must be wary of any educational approach which justifies itself primarily as 
modern, for modernity is a construct, and, therefore, it has the potential to be 
appropriated as a totalizing discourse. I am not advocating a historical regression, nor am 
I nostalgic for a time and place now forgotten. In fact, I am advocating to continue the 
process of modernity: to keep criticizing by turning inwards at modernity's tenets 
themselves. The uncontested supremacy of scientific, technology, and economics, the 
central tenet of modernity, can lead us back upon superstition, myth, and pseudo-
theology. Like the ouroboros, modernity, after questioning the tenets of organized 
religion as witnessed by the Enlightenment project, must question itself. This is the value 
of modernity, not a blind insistence upon progress. It is too easy to rely on scientific 
assessment, for instance, as a means to avoid the messiness of moral discourse. As I have 
demonstrated in this thesis, morality can never be completely avoided. Teaching without 
an awareness of this can lead to indoctrination. As discussed, we must interrogate even 
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the fundamental values of modernity in order to make them relevant to us, to keep them 
current. If we do not hold them up to the mirror of reality they can become archaic, left to 
petrify like material once organic, and, as a result, may no longer reflect out new social 
paradigms. If so, they must be abandoned or else we betray the necessity of critical 
inquiry we profess to hold central to secular education. If not, we are engaged in religious 
instruction, merely indoctrinating the secular theologies of our time, and, thus, the myths 
of modern education will continue to perpetuate unimpeded with the force of theocratic 
coercion. 
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